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Abstract:  
How should the European Union cope with Member States that no longer respect the 
basic values of the Union? This article reviews the cases of Hungary and Poland, 
showing the responses of the major European Union institutions to those two Member 
States as their governments removed checks on their power, eliminated the 
independence of judiciaries and failed to honour their European commitments. As the 
chapter demonstrates, the responses of EU institutions have so far been ineffective at 
bringing these Member States back into line with European values. We examine the 
various proposals that have been made to do better, concluding that there is some 
promise in some legal strategies that are available now but have yet to be tried.    
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‘The very functioning of the Union and its internal market 
is endangered if in one of its Member States the 
fundamental values, in particular the rule of law, are no 
longer respected.’ Frans Timmermans, 12 April 20171 
 
‘As usual, when the leaders – when the members of the 
great political elite – turn against their own people, there 
is always a need for inquisitors to launch proceedings 
against those who voice the opinion of the people. In our 
earlier four-year term, the European Union had a grand 
inquisitor, and her name was Madame Reding. That grand 
inquisitor failed, and now they’ve found a new one: the 
new grand inquisitor’s name is Timmermans … at this 
point in time, Poland is chosen as the inquisition’s main 
target in order to weaken, to destroy, to break national 
governance.’ Viktor Orbán , 22 July 20172 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In a speech delivered on 26 July 2014, Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian Prime Minister 
since 2010, explained that ‘the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an 
illiberal state, a non-liberal state’ which would ‘not reject the fundamental principles 
of liberalism such as freedom.’ Instead, it ‘does not make this ideology the central 																																																								
* We are indebted to Kenneth Armstrong, Dimitry Kochenov, Israel Butler, Jan-Werner Müller, Daniel 
Kelemen, Tomasz Koncewicz, Gábor Halmai, Joelle Grogan and Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska for 
their insightful comments on an earlier draft. This paper is current as of August 2015. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
1 Answer given by First Vice-President Timmermans on behalf of the European Commission to the 
question for written answer submitted by Claude Rolin (PPE), E-009716-16.  
2  Speech at the 28th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp, 22 July 2017, 
Tusnádfürdő (Băile Tuşnad, Romania), full text available here: 
https://visegradpost.com/en/2017/07/24/full-speech-of-v-orban-will-europe-belong-to-europeans/ 
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element of state organisation, but instead includes a different, special, national 
approach’.3 He further argued that he did not believe ‘that it is impossible to construct 
a new state built on illiberal and national foundations within the European Union’.4 
The implementation of Viktor Orbán’s illiberal state agenda has, however, 
regularly been decried by the EU and described by critics as having transformed 
Hungary into a ‘grey zone between democracy and dictatorship’5 and a ‘mafia state’.6 
The recurrent tension between the EU and Orbán recently culminated in the first ever 
adoption by the European Parliament of a resolution calling for a vote on the 
activation of the preventive arm of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
on the ground that the ‘current situation in Hungary represents a clear risk of a serious 
breach of the values’ on which the EU is based and which are said to be common to 
the EU Member States.7  
Article 7 TEU, which is often referred to (inaccurately in our view) as the 
EU’s ‘nuclear option’,8 was first inserted in the EU Treaties via the Amsterdam 
Treaty in order to empower the EU to monitor and eventually subject any of its 
Member States to sanctions in a situation of serious and persistent breach of the 
values laid down in Article 2 TEU, one of which is the rule of law.9 Article 7 was 
further amended by the Nice Treaty to provide for a public warning that EU values 
are in danger in the situation in which there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a 
Member State of those values. In this situation, provided that this provision is 
triggered, ‘the Council shall hear the Member State in question and may address 
recommendations to it’ according to Article 7(1) TEU. The public warning of Article 
7(1) is often referred to as the preventive arm while the declaration that there is a 
breach, potentially accompanied by any eventually sanctions such as the suspension 
of EU voting rights, is outlined in Article 7(2) and (3) and is often called the 
sanctioning arm. In 2014, the European Commission adopted a ‘Rule of Law 
Framework’ for assessing whether a Member State had endangered the rule of law 
sufficiently that Article 7 TEU should be invoked.10 
Two points may be worth emphasising at this early stage. First, the insertion 
of Article 7 revealed a lack of confidence amongst the Masters of the Treaties in the 
effectiveness of pre-accession conditionality11 at a time where the EU was getting 																																																								
3 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student 
Camp, full text reproduced on the official website of the Hungarian government, 30 July 2014: 
http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-
orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp  
4 Ibid.  
5 István Hegedus, co-founder of Hungary’s Fidesz party, quoted in M Fletcher, ‘Is Hungary the EU’s 
first rogue state? Viktor Orban and the long march from freedom’, New Statesman, 1 August 2017: 
http://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2017/08/hungary-eus-first-rogue-state-viktor-orban-and-
long-march-freedom 
6 Bálint Magyar (former Hungarian minister of education), ‘The EU’s Mafia State’, Project Syndicate, 
21 June 2017: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/orban-hungary-mafia-state-by-balint-
magyar-2017-06#comments 
7 Resolution of 17 May 2017 on the situation in Hungary (2017/2656(RSP)), para 9. 
8 For further analysis, see D Kochenov ‘Busting the myths nuclear: A commentary on Article 7 TEU’ 
EUI Working Paper LAW 2017/10. 
9 For further analysis, see L Pech, ‘A Union Founded on the Rule of Law: Meaning and Reality of the 
Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law’ 6 European Constitutional Law Review (2010) 
359. 
10 European Commission, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014) 158 final. 
11 See generally D Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality. Pre-accession 
Condititionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law (Kluwer Law International, 2008).  
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ready to welcome ten new countries from Eastern Europe. Existing Member States 
evidently hoped that the mere presence of Article 7 would act as a sufficient deterrent 
and prevent any democratic and rule of law backsliding post accession. Second, even 
the European Commission has taken the position that the scope of Article 7 ‘is not 
confined to areas covered by Union law’, which means that the Union may act ‘in the 
event of a breach in an area where the Member States act autonomously’ because any 
country breaching the EU’s fundamental values in a manner sufficiently serious to be 
caught by Article 7 would likely ‘undermine the very foundations of the Union and 
the trust between its members, whatever the field in which the breach occurs’.12 
While the situation in Hungary may well see the preventive arm of Article 7 
activated for the first time by the end of 2017, this provision has also become 
increasingly mentioned in the context of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Poland. 
Indeed, soon after winning the legislative elections in 2015, Poland’s Law and Justice 
(PiS) party ‘embarked on a course of change that places it solidly in the illiberal 
camp, with many of the initiatives mirroring those enacted by Fidesz in Hungary’,13 
especially its attempt to rapidly capture the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in order to 
be able to violate the Polish Constitution at will. The actions of PiS led the European 
Commission to activate its so-called Rule of Law Framework for the first time in 
January 2016.14 The situation in Poland has gone from bad to worse since and the 
multiple rule of law recommendations made by the Commission have not only been 
ignored but also openly and rudely dismissed by Polish authorities. Jarosław 
Kaczyński, Poland’s de facto leader, went as far as to argue that ‘there is nothing 
going on in Poland that contravenes the rule of law’.15 Faced with an attempt in July 
2017 to dismiss all of the Polish Supreme Courts judges, the European Commission 
finally explicitly threatened to trigger Article 7(1) TEU immediately ‘should the 
Polish authorities take any measure of this kind’.16 In the words of President Jean-
Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission:  
 
The Commission is determined to defend the rule of law in all our Member States as a 
fundamental principle on which our European Union is built. An independent judiciary is an 
essential precondition for membership in our Union. The EU can therefore not accept a 
system which allows dismissing judges at will. Independent courts are the basis of mutual 
trust between our Member States and our judicial systems. If the Polish government goes 
																																																																																																																																																														
For a detailed account of the origins of Article 7, see W Sadurski, ‘Adding Bite to Bark: The Story of 
Article 7, E.U. Enlargement, and Jörg Haider’ (2010) 16 Columbia Journal of European Law 385. 
12 European Commission, Communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. Respect for 
and promotion of the values on which the Union is founded, COM(2003) 606 final, 15 October 2003, 
section 1.1.  
13  A Puddington, Breaking Down Democracy: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern 
Authoritarians, Freedom House, June 2017, p 38.  
14 European Commission, Readout by First Vice-President Timmermans of the College Meeting of 13 
January 2016, Speech/16/71, Brussels, 13 January 2016.  
15 P Sobczak and J Pawlak, ‘Poland’s Kaczynski calls EU democracy inquiry "an absolute comedy"’, 
Reuters, 22 December 2016. Most recently, Kaczyński denounced the Commission’s ‘abuse’ of its 
powers and the political character of the Commission’s on-going monitoring of the rule of law situation 
in Poland on the ground that judiciary ‘reforms’ would fall exclusively within national jurisdiction: 
‘Poland's Kaczynski says EU's call to halt court reforms 'political'’ Reuters, 19 July 2017: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-politics-judiciary-kaczynski-idUSKBN1A428S?il=0  
16 Commission Recommendation of 26 July 2017 regarding the rule of law in Poland, C(2017) 5320 
final, para 58.  
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ahead with undermining the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law in Poland, we 
will have no other choice than to trigger Article 7.17 
 
 This article will focus on the EU’s attempts to address the systemic threats to 
and breaches of the rule of law that have materialised inside the EU. It will first 
explain how rule of law backsliding tends to happen in practice before offering a 
more theoretical definition of this notion (Part II). A summary of the key features of 
the Commission’s Rule of Law Framework in the light of its first activation against 
Poland will follow (Part III). The European Commission’s efforts to prevent or roll 
back what we call ‘rule of law backsliding’ in countries such as Hungary and Poland 
as well as the actions of the Council and European Parliament will then be critically 
assessed (Part IV). The paper will conclude with a brief overview of the new 
mechanism proposed by the European Parliament on 25 October 2016 and some 
suggestions on the possible way forward to deal with autocratic regimes within the 
EU (Part V). 
 To summarise our argument: The Commission invoked a new Rule of Law 
Framework to cope with a rapidly deteriorating situation in Poland, after the 
government bluntly attacked the Constitutional Tribunal, but we believe that this 
effort was bound to fail given that the new framework was based on the questionable 
presumption that a discursive approach could produce positive results. This 
presumption reflected the Commission’s failure to learn the right lessons from the 
Hungarian case, which strongly suggested that a discursive approach would be 
ineffective in a situation where there was a concerted plan to evade Article 2 values. 
The presumption of a discursive resolution further reflected the Commission’s failure 
to appreciate that would-be-authoritarians always seek to consolidate power as soon 
as possible and regrettably, the Rule of Law Framework simply delays the time when 
Article 7 TEU might be invoked until after the critical consolidation of power has 
already occurred. The Commission’s activation of the Rule of Law Framework 
against Poland has revealed further shortcomings, including the Commission’s failure 
to treat like situations alike by invoking the Rule of Law Framework only against 
Poland and not against Hungary as well as by the Commission’s reluctance to move 
to the next logical stage – Article 7 TEU– when confronted with belligerent rhetoric 
and complete non-compliance with its recommendations. In the Commission’s 
defence, however, it is difficult to be bold and firm when you have to work with 
intergovernmental institutions such as the European Council, which has been reluctant 
to engage in any criticism of Member States.    
 Looking beyond the Hungarian and Polish cases, our key argument is that the 
only way to prevent the occurrence of a consolidated autocracy in violation of EU 
values is to act fast as soon as the danger signals are clear. A recommendation for 
speed, however, goes against the general tendency of EU institutions to assume that 
stalling for time solves most problems. The Rule of Law Framework appears to be 
designed for normal times when simply slowing a process down cools heads and 
makes friendly resolution of disputes more likely. But in the abnormal times of a 
budding autocracy inside the EU, the Rule of Law Framework simply adds a de facto 
compulsory step before the activation of one of the two arms of Article 7. While this 
may enable the Commission to accumulate incriminating evidence and help create a 
political environment in which the rogue government may progressively lose the 
support of its peers before the eventual triggering of Article 7, the Framework has 																																																								
17 European Commission acts to preserve the rule of law in Poland, Press release IP/17/2161, Brussels, 
26 July 2017.  
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also arguably made the situation worse by enabling rogue governments, who did not 
care about their international reputations, to consolidate power in plain sight while the 
EU dithered over what to do.  
 If this problem of rogue Member States within the EU is to be solved, we 
believe that all EU institutions must use all of the tools at their disposal. The 
Commission must revive and reframe its use of the infringement procedure. We also 
call on the Commission to more vigorously press the European Council and the 
Council to unequivocally support its efforts in establishing unambiguous deadlines 
and instructions when the Rule of Law Framework has been invoked. The European 
Parliament could have triggered Article 7 if it had worked toward establishing the 
two-thirds vote it would take to do so. But that could only be done if partisan politics 
were put aside so that powerful parties such as the European People’s Party did not 
shield their member governments from the consequences of violating EU basic 
values. Even the Court of Justice must recognise that the EU faces new challenges 
that call for adjustment of existing doctrine created in better times. For instance, 
where any EU Member State ceases to comply with the most basic understanding of 
the rule of law and the EU institutions have otherwise failed to effectively correct the 
situation, the principle of mutual trust ought to be adjusted.  
 Europe has been juggling multiple crises in recent years, so the internal affairs 
of a rogue government or two may seem less critical to Europe’s well-being than 
crises that affect multiple states at the same time, like the euro-crisis, refugee crisis or 
the fallout from Brexit. But the proliferation inside the EU of governments that no 
longer share basic European values undermines the reason for existence of the EU in 
the first place. It also threatens the functioning of a legal framework which ‘is based 
on the fundamental premiss that each Member State shares with all the other Member 
States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the 
EU is founded’.18 The ‘values crisis’ may not seem as urgent as the other crises on 
European plates, but it has the most far-reaching implications for the European project 
because without common values, there are fewer reasons for the EU to exist. Europe 
therefore fails to act at its peril. And it needs to act before rogue governments bent on 
establishing authoritarian regimes become ever more entrenched. 
  
II. A NEW AND SPREADING PROBLEM:  
RULE OF LAW BACKSLIDING WITHIN THE EU 
 
As early as January 2011, when Hungary took up the rotating presidency of the 
Council, it was clear that all was not well. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán had only been 
in power for seven months, but Commission President José Manuel Barroso broke 
with the usual protocol during a joint press conference which customary involves only 
congratulating the incoming presidency for its preparation. Instead, Barroso strongly 
criticised the Hungarian government for having passed laws that raised concern about 
its commitment to basic values.19 These concerns were to be often repeated, as 																																																								
18 Opinion 2/13 (EU Accession to the ECHR), EU:C:2014:2454, para 168. For an overview of the main 
normative arguments justifying a reinforced monitoring by the EU of its Member States, see C Closa, 
‘Reinforcing EU Monitoring of the Rule of Law’ in C Closa and D Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule 
of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2016).  
19 The first laws to raise concern were media laws bringing all press outlets, whether public or private, 
broadcast, print or internet-based, under control of a media council that contained only members of the 
governing party. Statement by President Barroso at the press conference following the meeting of the 
European Commission with the Hungarian Presidency, 7 January 2011, Speech/11/4.   
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Hungary went on to adopt a new constitution containing provisions that challenged 
EU law,20 passed laws about the Central Bank that had not been the subject of 
consultation with the EU,21 captured the ordinary judiciary through lowering the 
judicial retirement age22 and fired the data protection ombudsman.23 At first, the 
Commission handled the consolidation of power in Hungary as a set of individual and 
separate acquis violations. 
By 2013, Viviane Reding, vice-president of the Commission, observed that the 
EU was facing unprecedented ‘rule of law crises’ revealing problems of a systemic 
nature.24 Soon after, President Barroso stressed the increasing number of ‘threats to 
the legal and democratic fabric in some of our European states’.25 Since then, the rule 
of law situation has continued to steadily worsen in Hungary under the stewardship of 
Viktor Orbán. The rule of law also abruptly deteriorated in Poland following the 
legislative victory of Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice Party in October 2015. 
While both the Barroso Commission and the subsequent Juncker Commission have 
made repeated worried comments about Hungary and the Juncker Commission has 
publicly criticized Poland, the situation has not improved.   
While many organisations, officials and experts have expressed serious and 
repeated concerns regarding ‘rule of law backsliding’ in these two countries, there is 
no established definition of this notion, which is now even used in EU official 
documents.26 Before we offer a definition, it may be useful to briefly explain how rule 
of law backsliding concretely occurs. The cases of Hungary and Poland, to mention 
only the EU examples of a broader international trend, suggest a new worrying 
pattern in the fate of constitutional democracies. One may go as far as to speak of a 
recipe for constitutional capture being followed in one state after another,27 a process 
which results in a systemic undermining of the key components of the rule of law 
such as independent and impartial courts.28 This process follows a well-organised 
script: 
 
(1) Rule of law backsliding tends to begin with a significant number of citizens losing faith in 
their system of government for a number of reasons which vary from increasing inequality, 
persistent unemployment or the predatory practices of the ruling elites. This is often 																																																								
20 The Commission sent a warning letter to the Hungarian government on 12 January 2012, less than 
two weeks after the new constitution came into effect: ‘The European Commission Sanctions Orbán’s 
Government’, European Parliament in Action, 30 January 2011: 
http://europarliament.touteleurope.eu/follow/news/news-details/news/the-european-commission-
sanctions-orbans-government.html   
21 ‘European Commission Warns Hungary over Central Bank Independence’, EurActiv, 21 December 
2011: http://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/eu-warns-hungary-over-central-bank-
independence  
22 Commission v. Hungary (judicial retirement age), Case 286/12, EU:C:2012:687.    
23 Commission v. Hungary (data protection officer), Case 288/12, EU:C:2014:237.  
24 V Reding, ‘The EU and the Rule of Law – What next?’ Speech/13/677, 4 September 2013. The 
former Justice Commissioner mentioned explicitly three countries in her speech: Romania, France and 
Hungary. For further analysis, see D Kochenov and L Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule 
of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality’ (2015) 11(3) European Constitutional Law Review 512. 
25 State of the Union Address, Speech 13/684, 11 September 2013.  
26  See e.g. European Commission, Turkey 2016 Report, Commission Staff Working Document, 
SWD(2016) 366 final, 9 November 2016, p 17: ‘There has been backsliding in the past year, in 
particular with regard to the independence of the judiciary.’  
27 K L Scheppele, ‘The End of the End of History’ forthcoming in University of Toronto Law Review.     
28 According to the European Commission’s Communication on a new EU Framework to strengthen 
the Rule of Law, COM(2014) 158 final/2, 19 March 2014, p. 4, other core sub-components of the rule 
of law include the principles of legality and legal certainty, the prohibition of arbitrariness of the 
executive powers, effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights.  
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accompanied by a crisis in the party system in which one of the mainstream parties is either 
riven with conflict or takes a sharp turn to an extreme which then presents itself as a normal 
option at the next election;  
 
(2) Disgruntled citizens vote to break the system by electing a leader who promises radical 
change, often referring to the ‘will of the people’ while attacking the pre-existing 
constitutional framework with cleverly crafted legalistic blueprints borrowed from other 
‘successful’ autocrats, a pattern that led Professor Cooley to speak of a new ‘League of 
Authoritarian Gentlemen’;29  
 
(3) The new autocrats act quickly to shut down the key offices that might resist their 
consolidation of power, which includes the independent judiciary, the media and the 
repressive institutions (security services, police, public prosecutor’s office);    
 
(4) To remain popular, these autocrats engage in benefit giveaways while they seek to control the 
public debate and eliminate alternative views through the bullying of civil society groups and 
the deployment of tax police and public prosecutors, newly captured, against their opponents; 
 
(5) They then change the election law, the electorate (by pushing the opposition out of the country 
or suppressing their votes) or both; 
 
(6) When voters eventually wake up to the damage done (usually too late, as the new autocrat has 
by that time destroyed any channel through which alternative views may be expressed), they 
have few options to resist because their constitutional system has been captured and no 
constitutional avenue remains to effectively challenge the government/ruling party;  
 
(7) In the unlikely situation where resistance nonetheless emerges from the Parliament or from 
the streets, biased referenda can always be organised to confirm the will of the leader under 
the guise of the will of ‘the people’, a notion which authoritarian populists find useful to rely 
upon in order to put themselves ‘above democratic institutions and to overcome obstacles’30 
which may stand in their way;  
 
(8) Having sealed the space against dissenting voices and rewritten electoral regulations, autocrats 
can then expect to get the votes they need to win subsequent elections by whipping up 
imaginary enemies or giving away state largesse to garner votes. In this way, the rotation of 
power from one party to another becomes a feature of the past. 
 
In light of this pattern of constitutional capture,31 we propose to define rule of law 
backsliding as the process through which elected public authorities deliberately 
implement governmental blueprints which aim to systematically weaken, annihilate or 
capture internal checks on power with the view of dismantling the liberal democratic 
state and entrenching the long-term rule of the dominant party. This process enables 																																																								
29 A Cooley, ‘The League of Authoritarian Gentlemen’, Foreign Policy, 30 January 2013. See also J-W 
Müller, ‘Rising to the challenge of constitutional capture: Protecting the rule of law within EU member 
states, Eurozine, 21 March 2014: http://www.eurozine.com/rising-to-the-challenge-of-constitutional-
capture; K L Scheppele ‘The Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas: The Post-9/11 Globalization of 
Public Law and the International State of Emergency’ in S Choudhry (ed), The Migration of 
Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
30 Report by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, State of Democracy, Human Rights and 
the Rule of Law, 2017, p 6.  
31 As explained by Professor Jan-Werner Müller, ‘constitutional capture is different from pervasive 
corruption (a major problem still in Bulgaria and Romania, for instance); but it is also different 
from individual rights violations, grave as the latter might be. Constitutional capture aims at 
systematically weakening checks and balances and, in the extreme case, making genuine changes in 
power exceedingly difficult’, ‘Rising to the challenge of constitutional capture’, note 29 above. For 
a more comprehensive account, see J-W Müller, ‘Should the EU protect democracy and the rule of 
law inside Member States’ (2015) 21(2) European Law Journal 141.  
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the establishment of electoral autocracies and the solidification of one-party states32 in 
which elected officials of the ruling party claim exclusive authority to act on behalf of 
‘the people’.  
Rule of law backsliding is a decisive issue for the whole EU because it not 
only affects the citizens of the country where this phenomenon is happening, but it 
also affects other EU citizens residing in any such ‘illiberal regime’ as well as, 
indirectly, all residents in the EU through these regimes’ participation in the EU’s 
decision-making processes and in the adoption of norms that bind all in the EU. In 
addition, given that implementation of EU law occurs primarily within Member 
States, a rogue government that no longer feels bound by the basic principles of the 
EU can create black holes within the EU where EU law no longer can be counted on.  
Consider, for example, how dependent EU Member States have become on each 
other’s independent courts.  Judicial capture by an illiberal governing party poses a 
threat to the correct, consistent and effective application of EU law within the affected 
(not to say infected) Member State.  It also poisons the use of EU mechanisms that are 
in place to guarantee the consistent interpretation and application of EU law at 
Member State level and to allow enforcement of national court judgments throughout 
the EU. In a nutshell, EU Member States have become too interdependent to confine 
the effects of rule of law backsliding only to the backsliding state.   
While we refer to ‘rule of law backsliding’ in this paper, a number of 
connected notions such as ‘stealth authoritarianism’, 33  ‘democratic decay’ 34  or 
‘authoritarian reversion’35 may be usefully relied upon to make sense of countries like 
Hungary and Poland. It is important however not to confuse rule of law backsliding 
with ‘mere’ structural rule of law deficiencies in countries that have been facing 
endemic corruption, weak institutional capacities, or insufficient resources at the 
administrative or judicial levels.36 Indeed, one often reads that major rule of law 
problems can be identified in other EU countries and one should not therefore single 
out Hungary and/or Poland. The existence of significant rule of law problems in EU 
Member States with historically weak or corrupt judiciaries or countries facing major 
budgetary cuts cannot be denied. We believe, however, that Hungary and Poland raise 
challenges of an utterly different nature because rule of law backsliding is a deliberate 
strategy pursued by public authorities with the goals of fundamentally undermining 
pluralism and creating a de facto one-party state where ‘changes in government 
through fair and honest elections become all but impossible’ following the capture of 
‘the executive and legislative branches, but also the media, the judiciary, civil society, 
the commanding heights of the economy, and the security forces’.37 These are states 
where the rule of law had in fact been achieved and is now being systematically 
dismantled, which is a different sort of problem from not being able to achieve the 
rule of law in the first place. Backsliding implies that a country was once better, and 																																																								
32 Sadly, this would mean a return to what was once a prevalent model in Eastern Europe: see e.g. J 
Frentzel-Zagórska (ed), From a One-Party State to Democracy (Rodopi, vol 32, 1993).  
33 O Varol ‘Stealth Authoritarianism’ (2015) 100 Iowa Law Review 1673.  
34 T G Daly, ‘Enough Complacency: Fighting Democratic Decay in 2017’, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law Blog, 10 January 2017: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/01/enough-
complacency-fighting-democratic-decay-in-2017-i-connect-column  
35 A Huq and T Ginsburg, ‘How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy’ (2018) 65 UCLA Law Review 
(forthcoming), preprint version available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2901776.  
36 A von Bogdandy and M Ioannidis ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: What is it, What has 
been done, What can be done’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 59.  
37  A Puddington, Breaking Down Democracy: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern 
Authoritarians, Freedom House, June 2017, p 1.   
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then regressed. We are particularly concerned where this retrogression is a deliberate 
strategy of a ruling party.    
 
III. THE COMMISSION’S SOLUTION:  
A NEW RULE OF LAW FRAMEWORK 
 
This section will offer an overview of the key features of the Rule of Law Framework 
(Part III.A), which the European Commission adopted in March 2014, before 
reviewing how this new instrument has been applied to Poland (Part III.B) and then 
offering a critical assessment of the Commission’s variable rationale to justify not 
acting similarly against Hungary (Part III.C).  
 
A. The Framework’s Key Features38 
 
In his 2013 State of Union address, José Manuel Barroso, then President of the 
European Commission, called for a new instrument that would fill the space between 
the Commission’s infringement powers laid down in Articles 258-260 TFEU, and 
what he referred to as the ‘nuclear option’ of collective sanctions laid down in Article 
7 TEU. Underlying this call for a new instrument was Barroso’s belief that neither of 
these two existing options could effectively avert or remedy rule of law crises of a 
systemic nature.  
Barroso’s ‘nuclear option’ was unhelpful because it further undermined the 
dissuasive nature of Article 7 and it was misleading because there was nothing 
‘nuclear’ about stating the mere existence of a risk of serious breach and eventually 
adopting recommendations to prevent this risk from materialising. That said, for a 
warning system, Article 7 is very difficult to use. Article 7(2) TEU requires that any 
sanction must follow a unanimous vote in the European Council (minus the country 
subject to the proceedings), something that is nearly impossible to obtain under any 
circumstances. Moreover, once there are two ‘illiberal’ national governments in the 
EU determined to assist each other, this makes the deployment of the ‘biting’ clause 
of Article 7 impossible unless both countries are tackled de concert.39Hungary has 
already committed itself to blocking any eventual sanctions against Poland and vice 
versa.40 Article 7(1) does however contain another clause providing for the adoption 
of ‘recommendations’ by the Council should the Council agree that a clear risk of a 
serious breach of EU values is imminent and that clause does not require unanimity. 
That said, even invoking this first “warning” step is difficult, since it requires a two-
thirds majority of the European Parliament and four-fifths of the Member States in the 
Council to agree.   
With respect to the infringement procedure, the Commission’s narrow 
interpretation of its powers means that it has so far only pursued individual cases 
where national authorities do not implement or correctly apply specific provisions of 
EU law. This led Barroso to conclude that infringement actions could not be 
effectively used against ‘illiberal governments’ when they acted outside the strict 
scope of EU law or where they violated EU values, which are themselves of a 																																																								
38 This section borrows from Kochenov and Pech, note 24 above.  
39 K L Scheppele ‘ EU Can Still Block Hungary’s Veto on Polish Sanctions’ Politico, 11 January 2016: 
http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-can-still-block-hungarys-orban-veto-onpolish- 
pis-sanctions  
40 See e.g. H Foy et al, ‘Orban promises to veto any EU sanctions against Poland’ Financial Times, 8 
January 2016.  
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political and diffuse nature not susceptible to enforcement through infringement 
actions as currently understood.41 Under this interpretation, for instance, in the 
absence of any general EU legislative competence over the organisation of national 
judiciaries or the standards of higher education systems, governmental attacks on 
courts or universities – either through legal means or through budgetary and other 
non-legal strategies – may not be easily subject to infringement proceedings. This 
explains, for instance, why the Commission sought to protect judicial independence in 
Hungary via an infringement action based on age discrimination.42 Most recently, in 
the context of Orbán’s attempts to shut down the Central European University, the 
Commission similarly chose an indirect route to protect academic freedom via an 
infringement action primarily based on a breach of freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services.43  In both cases, the charged violation missed the reason 
why the practice was deeply disturbing as a violation of the basic tenets of the rule of 
law.    
The Commission read Articles 7 TEU and 258 TFEU narrowly when it 
answered the Justice and Home Affairs Council’s express request in 2013 that it 
should ‘take forward the debate in line with the Treaties on the possible need for and 
shape of a collaborative and systematic method to tackle’44 rule of law backsliding. 
Believing it could not act with the tools available, the Commission concluded that a 
new instrument was needed. Known as the Rule of Law Framework, this instrument, 
adopted in March 2014, takes the form of an early warning system whose primary 
purpose is to enable the Commission to enter into a structured dialogue with the 
Member State concerned so as to prevent perceived systemic threats to the rule of law 
from escalating. This procedure consists of three main phases: (i) In the assessment 
phase, the Commission assesses whether there are clear preliminary indications of a 
systemic threat in the country under preliminary investigation in which case a ‘rule of 
law opinion’ will be sent to the government concerned; (ii) In a situation where no 
appropriate actions are taken following the notification of the opinion, a ‘rule of law 
recommendation’ may be adopted and may include specific suggestions on ways and 
measures to resolve the situation within a prescribed deadline; (iii) Finally, in the 
follow-up phase, the Commission monitors how its recommendation is implemented. 
Lacking satisfactory implementation, the Commission may then decide at its 
discretion whether a recourse to Article 7 TEU is warranted, hence the informal name 
given to the Framework: the ‘pre-Article 7 procedure’.  																																																								
41 See L W Gormley, ‘Infringement Proceedings’ in A Jakab and D Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement 
of EU Law and Values: Methods against Defiance (Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 78: ‘the 
likelihood of the Commission acting via the infringement proceedings route in relation to Article 2 
TEU seems little more than zero’.  
42 European Commission, ‘European Commission closes infringement procedure on forced retirement 
of Hungarian judges’, Press Release IP/13/1112, 20 November 2013.  
43 European Commission, ‘Hungary: Commission takes legal action on Higher Education Law and sets 
record straight on ‘Stop Brussels’ consultation’, Daily News MEX/17/1116, 26 April 2017. 
44 Council conclusions on fundamental rights and rule of law and on the Commission 2012 Report on 
the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs 
Council meeting, Luxembourg, 6 and 7 June 2013, para 9. This request would have most likely never 
seen the light of day if the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Germany and the 
Netherlands had not sent a letter to the President of the Commission on 6 March 2013 in which they 
raised ‘the need to develop a new and more effective mechanism to safeguard fundamental values in 
the Member states’: European Parliament, Working Document I on the situation of fundamental rights 
in the European Union in 2012, LIBE Committee, Rapporteur: Louis Michel, PE514.668, 21 June 
2013, p 4.  
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Though the Framework was clearly designed for the case of Hungary, the first 
time it was activated was when Poland followed Hungary’s lead soon after the Law 
and Justice Party won an absolute majority in the Polish Parliament in October 2015 
with only 38% of the vote.   
 
B. The Framework’s First Activation Against Poland45 
 
1. The Commission’s Initial Rule of Law Recommendation  
 
On 13 January 2016, the European Commission announced that it would carry out a 
preliminary assessment of the situation in Poland under the Rule of Law Framework. 
According to Frans Timmermans, First Vice-President of the European Commission 
who holds the inaugural rule of law portfolio, the primary justification for this 
unprecedented step was the fact that the rulings of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
were ‘not respected’, which ‘is a serious matter in any rule of law-dominated state’.46 
The legislative changes adopted by the Sejm with respect to Public Service 
Broadcasters was the other justification put forward on the ground that democracy 
requires the protection of ‘freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and respect of 
the rules governing the political and electoral processes’.47 
In the absence of any concrete action by the Polish authorities to resolve the 
Commission’s rule of law concerns, the Commission formalised them in an Opinion 
adopted on 1 June 2016, which was not initially made public.48 Polish authorities 
were then invited to submit their observations in response to the Opinion. In the 
continuing absence of any satisfactory resolution of its concerns, the Commission 
finally adopted a Recommendation on 27 July 2016.49 In the words of First Vice-
President Frans Timmermans: 
 
Despite the dialogue pursued with the Polish authorities since the beginning of the year, the 
Commission considers the main issues which threaten the rule of law in Poland have not been 
resolved. We are therefore now making concrete recommendations to the Polish authorities on 
how to address the concerns so that the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland can carry out its 
mandate to deliver effective constitutional review.50 
 																																																								
45 This section borrows from the following blog posts: L Pech and K L Scheppele, ‘Poland and the 
European Commission, Part I: Dialogue of the Deaf’, Verfassungblog, 3 January 2017: 
http://verfassungsblog.de/poland-and-the-european-commission-part-i-a-dialogue-of-the-deaf/; ‘Part II: 
Hearing the Siren Song of the Rule of Law’, Verfassungblog, 6 January 2017: 
http://verfassungsblog.de/poland-and-the-european-commission-part-ii-hearing-the-siren-song-of-the-
rule-of-law/; ‘Part III: Requiem for the Rule of Law’, Verfassungblog, 3 March 2017: 
http://verfassungsblog.de/poland-and-the-european-commission-part-iii-requiem-for-the-rule-of-law/  
46 European Commission, Readout by First Vice-President Timmermans of the College Meeting of 13 
January 2016, Speech/16/71, Brussels, 13 January 2016. When the new Law and Justice Party (PiS) 
government took office in October 2015, it nullified the election of constitutional judges by the prior 
parliament and substituted its own judges for theirs. The Constitutional Court declared the election of 
duplicate judges unconstitutional but the government refused to publish or acknowledge the ruling. 
47 Ibid. 
48 The Opinion was subsequently published following a request to obtain this document lodged by L 
Pech, ‘Commission Opinion on the rule of law in Poland’, EU Law Analysis, 18 August 2016: 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/08/commission-opinion-of-1-june-2016.html  
49 European Commission, Recommendation of 27 July 2016 regarding the rule of law in Poland, 
C(2016) 5703 final.  
50 Quoted in European Commission, Rule of Law: Commission issues recommendation to Poland, 
Press release IP/16/2643, 27 July 2016.  
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The Recommendation gave Polish authorities three months to implement a total of 
five ‘concrete recommendations’. The most significant of these five recommendations 
required Polish authorities to fully implement the judgments of the Constitutional 
Tribunal, which Polish authorities had refused to publish and follow, so as to be able 
to ‘capture’ the Constitutional Tribunal by (unconstitutionally) appointing judges 
approved by the ruling party.   
Rather than seeking to implement any of the European Commission’s 
recommendations or even engage in a façade of dialogue with it, the Polish 
government instead focused its energy on denying the legality of Commission’s Rule 
of Law Framework. The leader of the ruling Law and Justice Party (hereinafter: PiS) 
threatened the Commission with an annulment action against the Rule of Law 
Framework while Poland was in the middle of being reviewed under that 
Framework.51 This threat was oblivious to the fact that neither the Rule of Law 
Opinion of 1 June 2016 nor the Rule of Law Recommendation of 27 July 2016 were, 
strictly speaking, legally binding acts. As such, they could not be subject to 
annulment actions. Indeed, the Commission’s pre-Article 7 procedure was specifically 
adopted with the view of promoting the resolution of rule of law problems via a 
discursive, soft law approach.  
Even if an action for annulment could have been brought, the argument that 
the European Commission overstepped its mandate does not sustain scrutiny. Indeed, 
Article 7(1) TEU implicitly empowers the Commission to investigate any potential 
risk of a serious breach of EU values by giving it the competence to submit a 
reasoned proposal to the Council should the Commission be of the view that Article 7 
TEU ought to be triggered on this basis. In other words, Article 7 TEU already allows 
the monitoring of EU countries prior to the determination of a serious breach of EU 
values given the obvious need for the Council to be able to rely on solid factual 
evidence before eventually finding against a rogue Member State.52 The Rule of Law 
Framework merely makes more transparent how the communication between the 
Commission and the potentially offending government shall proceed.   
Be that as it may, the Polish government did not limit itself to challenging the 
legality and legitimacy of the Commission’s actions. It also actively continued to 
further undermine the functioning of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal via the 
adoption of a new Act on 22 July 2016 that strongly limited the independence of the 
court. This led the Venice Commission,53  in another Opinion dedicated to the 
situation in Poland, to regret that 																																																								
51 J Cienski and M de la Baume ‘Poland and Commission plan crisis talks’ Politico, 30 May 2016: 
http://www.politico.eu/article/poland-and-commission-plan-crisis-talks/  
52 The fact that the Council of the EU accepted the Commission’s request to discuss ‘the state of play 
of its dialogue with Poland on the rule of law’ before emphasising ‘the importance of continuing the 
dialogue between the Commission and Poland’ suggest an implicit acceptance of the legality of the 
Commission’s Rule of Law Framework. See Council of the European Union, Outcome of the Council 
Meeting, 3536th Council Meeting, General Affairs, 16 May 2017, 9299/17, p 6.  
53 The Venice Commission is not an EU body but is the Council of Europe’s advisory body on 
constitutional matters. The Venice Commission has the power to produce reports on its own initiative 
or at the request of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, Parliamentary Assembly, 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, Secretary General, or by a state or international 
organisation (e.g. the European Union) or body participating in the work of the Commission. As noted 
by Paul Craig, ‘liaison between the Venice Commission and the European Commission has been 
especially prominent in relation to rule of law problems that have arisen in EU countries, such as 
Hungary and Poland, while cooperation with OSCE/ODIHR is most common in the context of 
elections’: P Craig ‘Transnational Constitution-Making: The Contribution of the Venice Commission 
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instead of unblocking the precarious situation of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Parliament 
and Government continue to challenge the Tribunal’s position as the final arbiter of 
constitutional issues and attribute this authority to themselves. They have created new 
obstacles to the effective functioning of the Tribunal instead of seeking a solution on the basis 
of the Constitution and the Tribunal’s judgments, and have acted to further undermine its 
independence. By prolonging the constitutional crisis, they have obstructed the Constitutional 
Tribunal, which cannot play its constitutional role as the guardian of democracy, the rule of 
law and human rights.54 
 
Faced with what Professor Sadurski has not unreasonably described as a 
‘constitutional coup d’état’55 and a government denying the existence of a problem, 
the Commission was left with no choice but to conclude that Poland had failed to 
implement any of its recommendations.56 But instead of promptly activating Article 7 
TEU so as to prevent the capture of the Constitutional Tribunal before the expiry of 
its President’s term of office on 19 December 2016, the Commission decided instead 
to adopt an additional Recommendation on 21 December 2016, a step not explicitly 
foreseen in the 2014 Communication describing the Rule of Law Framework.  Faced 
with a clear situation of defiance, the Commission failed to trigger Article 7 and 
instead played for more time. 
 
2. The Commission’s Complementary Rule of Law Recommendation  
 
This complementary Recommendation was justified on the basis that some ‘important 
issues remain unresolved’ while ‘new concerns have arisen in the meantime’.57 The 
new concerns continued to be primarily connected to the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal and its enduring inability to ensure the effective constitutional review of 
legislative acts due to the repeated attempts by Polish authorities to undermine its 
legitimacy and efficiency. By the time the Complementary Recommendation issued, a 
PiS-appointed judge had become the acting president in violation of the usual 
procedure for election of an acting president and was well on her way to becoming the 
permanent president in the same day.   
Seeing the final capture of the Tribunal coming, the Commission highlighted 
three new issues in particular that the actions of the Polish government had added to 
its list of violations of the rule of law:58 (i) the adoption of three new laws since its 
first Recommendation, laws designed to further interfere with the operation of the 
Constitutional Tribunal by providing a roadmap for the PiS party to capture the 
presidency of the court; (ii) the appointment of an interim president in a highly 
unusual manner, pursuant to one of the new laws and (iii) abandonment of the normal 																																																																																																																																																														
on Law and Democracy’ (2017) 2 UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative 
Law 57, p 72.  
54 Venice Commission, Poland – Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, 108th Plenary 
session, CDL-AD(2016)026-e, Venice, 14-15 October 2016, para 128. 
55 ‘What is going on in Poland is an attack against Democracy’, Interview with Verfassungblog, 15 July 
2016: http://verfassungsblog.de/what-is-going-on-in-poland-is-an-attack-against-democracy/  
56 The Commission required Polish authorities to publish were expurgated from the Constitutional 
Tribunal’s database after the government finally captured the Court. See Ł Woźnicki, ‘Wyroki Trybunału 
Konstytucyjnego znikają jak u Orwella’ (Constitutional Court’s judgments disappear as in Orwell), Gazeta Wyborcza, 16 
May 2017, p. 3. 
57 Commission Recommendation 2017/146 of 21 December 2016 regarding the rule of law in Poland 
complementary to Commission Recommendation 2016/1374 of 27 July 2016, C(2016) 8950 final, para 
61. 
58 Ibid, para 25 et seq. 
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procedure for filling the vacancy of the presidency of the Court. But as the 
Commission was issuing the new Recommendation, the Polish government sped up 
and magnified the violations by acting in contradiction of a direct request from the 
Commission to not fill the Tribunal’s presidency. Given this pattern of conduct, it is 
difficult to understand why the Commission thought it would be useful to continue to 
pursue any sort of dialogue with a government that was so plainly and disrespectfully 
ignoring its warnings.  
Be that as it may, the Commission eventually concluded that the three laws 
mentioned above and signed by the Polish President of the Republic on 19 December 
2016, largely duplicated the Law of 22 July 2016 previously severely criticised by 
both the European Commission and the Venice Commission as well as previously 
declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal. The government had refused 
to publish or follow the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal that declared this prior 
law unconstitutional. Moreover, the re-enactment of the unconstitutional law 
represented a frontal challenge to the Court and to the European Commission This led 
the Commission to logically conclude that the new laws continued to ‘seriously 
threaten the legitimacy of the Constitutional Tribunal and consequently the 
effectiveness of the constitutional review’.59 In light of the continuing existence of a 
situation of a systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland, Polish authorities were 
asked to address the Commission’s criticisms within two months of receipt of the 
Commission’s complementary Recommendation. In a thinly veiled warning, the 
Commission finally pointed out that ‘recommendations adopted under the rule of law 
Framework do not prevent the mechanisms set out in Article 7 TEU being activated 
directly, should a sudden deterioration in a Member State require a stronger reaction 
from the EU’.60  
Despite an obvious continuing deterioration of the situation from the time that 
the Rule of Law Framework was first activated through the public and intemperate 
rejection of all of its recommendations,61 the Commission has appeared unable to 
draw the logical conclusion from its own analysis and move closer to actually starting 
a sanctioning process. This omission is all the more shocking because the actions of 
the Polish government in December openly defied a particular warning that it should 
not fill the position of Tribunal president before it had complied with the EU’s earlier 
warnings. By failing to act more forcefully as soon as the deadline laid down in its 
first Recommendation had expired, the Commission left Polish authorities ample time 
to prepare the ground for the effective capture of the Constitutional Tribunal not only 
in relative peace but also in plain disregard of the Polish Constitution.62 Looking for 																																																								
59 Ibid, para 60. 
60 Ibid, para 69. 
61 See e.g. Statement of the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU on the 
Situation in Poland: http://network-presidents.eu/sites/default/files/StatementPoland.pdf; Statement of 
the ENCJ Executive Board concerning judicial reforms in Poland, Brussels, 26 April 2017: 
https://www.encj.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=235%3Ajudicialreformspoland
&catid=22%3Anews&lang=en; OSCE/ODIHR, Final Opinion on Draft Amendments to the Act on the 
National Council of the Judiciary and Certain Other Acts of Poland, 5 May 2017, para 13: ‘If adopted, 
the amendments could undermine the very foundations of a democratic society governed by the rule of 
law, which OSCE participating States have committed to respect as a prerequisite for achieving 
security, justice and stability.’ 
62 See e.g. T Koncewicz, ‘Constitutional Capture in Poland 2016 and Beyond: What is Next?’ 
Verfassungblog, 19 December 2016: http://verfassungsblog.de/constitutional-capture-in-poland-2016-
and-beyond-what-is-next/ and the joint statement by four former presidents of the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal, Verfassungblog, 30 November 2016: http://verfassungsblog.de/statement-by-the-former-
To	be	published	in	Cambridge	Yearbook	of	European	Legal	Studies	(23	August	2017)	
	
15	
any reason not to do what any reasonable assessment of the situation would lead any 
lawyer to conclude, the Commission decided to procrastinate further by seeking to get 
national governments to debate the Polish situation. This was done on 16 May 2017 
within the framework of a meeting of the General Affairs Council, though it was 
discussed under the unpromising heading ‘any other business’. While the discussion 
was unprecedented and positive to the extent that the Commission’s diagnosis and 
recommendations appeared to have been strongly supported by most national 
governments, the session merely resulted in the following two-sentence conclusion:  
 
The Commission informed the Council on the state of play of its dialogue with Poland on the 
rule of law. Ministers emphasised the importance of continuing the dialogue between the 
Commission and Poland.63  
 
In other words, having sought action from the Council, the Commission found itself 
tasked with more dialogue, much time having been wasted in the process with no 
tangible sign of any conforming behaviour in Warsaw and no deadline imposed by 
which time Article 7 would be invoked. As expected, the Council’s rather lukewarm 
support for the rule of law and persistent inability to unambiguously and publicly 
censure Polish authorities have since convinced the Polish ruling party that nothing 
would ever come of sanctions. Instead, the Polish government evidently concluded 
that it was time to double down and capture the whole judicial system in plain sight. 
But instead of immediately triggering Article 7, the Commission decided once again 
to give more time for dialogue.  
 
3. The Commission’s Third Rule of Law Recommendation 
 
Adopted on 26 July 2017, the Commission’s third Rule of Law Recommendation 
complements its previous two Recommendations.64 This third Recommendation is 
justified by four new legislative acts rushed through the Polish Parliament that month: 
(i) The law on the Supreme Court; (ii) the Law on the National Council for the 
Judiciary; (iii) the Law on the Ordinary Courts’ Organisation; and (iv) the Law on the 
National School of Judiciary. Together, they allowed the government to fire all judges 
of the Supreme Court and to replace the leadership of the lower courts, as well as to 
take over the system of judicial appointments from that moment forward. Even 
though the first two laws were unexpectedly vetoed on 24 July by the Polish President 
under massive pressure from street demonstrations, Kaczynski announced that he 
would not take no for an answer and vowed to introduce the laws again.    
For the Commission, these laws, if they were to enter into force, would simply 
abolish the rule of law in Poland as they would ‘structurally undermine the 
independence of the judiciary in Poland and would have an immediate and concrete 
impact on the independent functioning of the judiciary as a whole’. 65  The 
Commission significantly diagnosed that the unconstitutional recomposition of the 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal already meant that ‘the constitutionality of Polish laws 
can no longer be effectively guaranteed’ and its judgments ‘can no longer be 																																																																																																																																																														
presidents-of-the-constitutional-tribunal-marek-safjan-jerzy-stepien-bohdan-zdziennicki-and-andrzej-
zoll/  
63 Council of the EU, 3536th Council meeting, General Affairs, 9299/17, 16 May 2017. 
64 Commission Recommendation of 26 July 2017 regarding the rule of law in Poland, C(2017) 5320 
final.  
65 Ibid, para 45(2).  
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considered as providing an effective constitutional review’. 66  Even though the 
Commission’s own reasoning led it to conclude that there had been a complete 
breakdown of the rule of law in Poland, it could still not act. Instead, Frans 
Timmermans warned that ‘the option of triggering Article 7 of the Treaty was part of 
the discussion and it should come as no surprise to anyone that, given the latest 
developments, we are coming very close to triggering Article 7’.67 
Of course, any attempt to use the sanctioning arm of Article 7 against Poland 
alone was doomed as Viktor Orbán had already made a public commitment to defend 
Poland should the EU attempt to adopt sanctions under this Treaty provision.68 So the 
Commission went a different route: it decided to initiate an infringement procedure 
regarding the Law on the Ordinary Courts Organisation on the grounds that this 
legislation would not only violate EU gender discrimination rules by introducing a 
different retirement age for female and male judges but it would also undermine the 
independence of Polish courts by permitting the government to replace the leadership 
of the lower courts, the independence of which would be required under Article 19(1) 
TEU and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.69  
This emphasis on the possible violation of the principle of judicial 
independence is important as it may, if confirmed by the Court of Justice, give the 
Commission power to insist on major changes to the judiciary under the pain of 
Article 260 TFEU sanctions, where no Member State can block such a move.70 In 
addition, a finding that judicial independence has been compromised could also lead 
to the suspension of the principle of mutual trust where Poland is concerned.71 
However, as will be shown below, the Commission has in the past tried to 
‘tame’ Orbán’s autocratic behaviour via multiple infringement actions but this only 
led to Pyrrhic victories. It would also be naïve to think that current Polish authorities 
will respond with anything but their usual disdain should the Court of Justice rule 
against them.  
Indeed, in the context of another infringement action initiated by the 
Commission following increased logging in the Białowieża Forest, a protected Natura 
2000 site, the Polish government has publicly indicated its intention to ignore the 
Court of Justice’s interim injunction to suspend all logging.72 In the words of Poland’s 
environment minister, Poles ‘will not be insulted by those who don’t know about the 
rules of protection of environment’.73 Similar defiant rhetoric has been used by 																																																								
66 Ibid, para 45(1).  
67 European Commission, Opening remarks of First Vice-President Frans Timmermans: College 
readout on grave concerns about the clear risks for independence of the judiciary in Poland, 19 July 
2017, Speech/17/2084.  
68 See Viktor Orbán’s speech at the 28th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp, 22 
July 2017, Tusnádfürdő (Băile Tuşnad, Romania): ‘we must make it perfectly clear that a campaign of 
inquisition against Poland will never succeed, because Hungary will resort to all the legal mechanisms 
offered by the European Union in order to show its solidarity with the Polish people.’ Full text of the 
speech is available here: https://visegradpost.com/en/2017/07/24/full-speech-of-v-orban-will-europe-
belong-to-europeans/ 
69 European Commission acts to preserve the rule of law in Poland, Press release IP/17/2161, 26 July 
2017 
70 For further analysis, see part V.B. 
71 For further analysis, see Part IV.B.  
72 Commission v Poland, C-441/17 R, EU:C:2017:622.  
73 J Berendt, ‘Defying E.U. Court, Poland Is Cutting Trees in an Ancient Forest’ New York Times, 31 
July 2017. According to a CJEU spokesperson, ‘the idea that the member state wouldn’t comply with a 
court order is unprecedented, and [so is] what the consequences would be’, cited in K Oroschakoff and 
W Kość, ‘Poland opens another front with Brussels over primeval forest’, Politico, 9 August 2017.  
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Hungarian officials in their dealings with EU since Viktor Orbán appears to have 
understood US President Trump’s election as a licence to once again mock EU 
authorities and flout EU values in plain sight as it has moved to harass and close some 
of the last remaining independent civil institutions in the country that get funding 
from American sources.74 And yet again, the Commission is proving reluctant to 
either submit Hungary to the Rule of Law Framework or trigger Article 7 in the face 
of overwhelming evidence that Orbán’s Hungary cares not a whit for the rule of law. 
 
C. The Commission’s Persistent Refusal to Activate  
the Rule of Law Framework Against Hungary 
 
Rather than offering an overview of the structural and continuing attacks on the rule 
of law in Hungary since Viktor Orbán returned to power – they have been well 
documented elsewhere75 – the Commission’s reasons for not acting more forcefully 
against Hungary will be analysed here.  
Before the latest set of attacks targeting the Central European University and 
civil society groups occurred in spring 2017, the European Parliament had made clear 
in December 2015 its concerns that there was a systemic deterioration of the situation 
in Hungary,76 highlighting among other things measures adopted against human rights 
of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, the functioning of the constitutional 
system, the independence of the judiciary, ‘and many worrying allegations of 
corruption and conflicts of interest’.77 This diagnosis led the Parliament to call on  
 
the Commission to activate the first stage of the EU framework to strengthen the rule of law’ 
so to as initiate ‘an in-depth monitoring process concerning the situation of democracy, the 
rule of law and fundamental rights in Hungary, including the combined impact of a number of 
measures, and evaluating the emergence of a systemic threat in that Member State which 
could develop into a clear risk of a serious breach within the meaning of Article 7 TEU’.78  
 
The resolution further added that Hungary ‘is a test for the EU to prove its capacity 
and political willingness to react to threats and breaches of its own founding values by 
																																																								
74 The Commission acted quickly to initiate an infringement action when the Hungarian Parliament 
adopted a law that would have the effect of closing American-accredited Central European University, 
but did not expedite the process to allow its intervention to have any effect before the deadlines set in 
the law took effect. A new NGO law has just taken effect as we write, requiring NGOs to disclose 
foreign sources of funding. On 13 July 2017, the Commission decided to send a letter of formal notice 
to Hungary as this law would breach EU law and in particular the right to freedom of association 
enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rules governing the free movement of 
capital: European Commission, ‘Hungary: Commission launches infringement procedure for law on 
foreign-funded NGOs’, Press release IP/17/1982. See Part III.C for further analysis.  
75 See e.g. the references given in the multiples resolutions adopted by the European Parliament and 
most recently, its resolution of 17 May 2017 on the situation in Hungary (2017/2656(RSP)). For more 
comprehensive accounts, see also B Jávor (Green MEP), Letter to Mr. Timmermans on the systemic 
threat to the rule of law in Hungary, 5 May 2017: http://javorbenedek.hu/en/letter-to-mr-timmermans-
on-the-systemic-threat-to-the-rule-of-law-in-hungary; FIDH (International Federation for Human 
Rights), Hungary: Democracy under Threat. Six Years of Attacks against the Rule of Law, November 
2016, No 684a: https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/hungary_democracy_under_threat.pdf   
76  European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2015 on the situation in Hungary 
(2015/2935(RSP)). 
77 para F.  
78 para 8.  
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a Member State’79 and noted that EU inaction may have contributed to similar 
developments taking place in some other Member States.80  
The Commission did not reply with a similar sense of urgency and threat. In 
her speech at the European Parliament before the adoption of this resolution, Věra 
Jourová, the Commissioner for Justice, argued that she saw no ‘grounds at this stage 
to trigger Article 7 or the Rule of Law Framework’.81 After providing a shockingly 
long list of violations of EU law committed by Hungarian authorities – apparently not 
realising she was actually making an overwhelming case for more drastic action – the 
Commissioner concluded that ‘concerns about the situation in Hungary are being 
addressed by a range of infringement procedures and pre-infringement procedures, 
and that also the Hungarian justice system has a role to play’.82 
Jourová’s justifications of the Commission’s position failed to convince a 
majority of MEPs who correctly emphasised that the Commission’s approach 
‘focuses mainly on marginal, technical aspects of the legislation while ignoring the 
trends, patterns and combined effect of the measures on the rule of law and 
fundamental rights’ and continues to ignore that infringement proceedings ‘have 
failed in most cases to lead to real changes and to address the situation more 
broadly.’83 The European Parliament could have also pointed out that it is ludicrous to 
believe that the ‘Hungarian justice system’ could remedy to any serious extent the 
threats and breaches of EU values identified in the Parliament’s resolution because 
the independence and impartiality of the Hungarian judiciary had already been fatally 
undermined following repeated and ultimately successful attempts by Orbán’s ruling 
party to seize control over the appointment of judges, determine according to political 
criteria the viability of individual judge’s careers and seize the process through which 
cases were assigned to specific judges. 
Orbán has since pushed through the Hungarian Parliament new laws that 
provide additional reasons for rule of law concern: an Act amending the National 
Higher Education Act which has the practical effect of singling out Central European 
University for effective closure (hence nicknamed Lex CEU) and a new Act on the 
Transparency of Organisations Receiving Support from Abroad that would stigmatize 
all NGOs and foundations receiving foreign money by requiring them to disclose all 
sources of income and label themselves as foreign funded.84 These renewed attacks on 																																																								
79 para 5. 
80 The Parliament had enacted many previous resolutions with regard to the situation in Hungary, most 
ambitiously the ‘Tavares Report’, named after its rapporteur, which passed the European Parliament in 
July 2013: See European Parliament resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of fundamental rights: 
standards and practices in Hungary, A7-0229/2013. This resolution concluded (para 57) ‘that the 
systemic and general trend of repeatedly modifying the constitutional and legal framework in very 
short time frames, and the content of such modifications, are incompatible with the values referred to in 
Article 2 TEU, Article 3, paragraph 1, and Article 6 TEU, and deviate from the principles referred to in 
Article 4, paragraph 3, TEU; [and the Parliament] considers that – unless corrected in a timely and 
adequate manner – this trend will result in a clear risk of a serious breach of the values referred to in 
Article 2 TEU...’ 
81 European Parliament, Question for oral answer to the Commission by Claude Moraes on behalf of 
the LIBE Committee (O-000140/2015): Situation in Hungary: follow-up to European Parliament 
resolution of 10 June 2015 (2015/2935(RSP)) (B8-1110/2015), Brussels, 2 December 2015.  
82 Ibid. 
83  European Parliament, Resolution of 16 December 2015 on the situation in Hungary 
(2015/2935(RSP)), para 7.  
84 For a critique of the Lex CEU adopted on 4 April 2017, see G Halmai, ‘Legally sophisticated 
authoritarians: the Hungarian Lex CEU’, Verfassungblog, 31 March 2017: 
http://verfassungsblog.de/legally-sophisticated-authoritarians-the-hungarian-lex-ceu and P Bard, The 
Open Society and Its Enemies: An attack against CEU, academic freedom and the rule of law, CEPS 
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academic freedom and civil society have however led to strong criticism not only 
from EU institutions but also individual EU Member States, the Council of Europe as 
well as and perhaps more surprisingly from the US government.85 Most importantly, 
it led to the adoption of yet another resolution by the European Parliament on the 
situation in Hungary on 17 May 2017. This time, however, on the back of increasing 
uneasiness within the ranks of the European People’s Party regarding Orbán’s 
authoritarian behaviour and anti-EU rhetoric,86 the European Parliament crossed the 
Rubicon and called for preparations to be made for a vote on triggering Article 7(1) 
TEU, the preventive arm of the mislabelled ‘nuclear option.’ In this resolution, the 
European Parliament noted that it 
 
9. Believes that the current situation in Hungary represents a clear risk of a serious breach of 
the values referred to in Article 2 of the TEU and warrants the launch of the Article 7(1) TEU 
procedure;  
 
10. Instructs its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs therefore to initiate 
the proceedings and draw up a specific report with a view to holding a plenary vote on a 
reasoned proposal calling on the Council to act pursuant to Article 7(1) of the TEU, in 
accordance with Rule 83 of its Rules of Procedure87 
 
Faced with this renewed call for meaningful action, the First Vice-President of 
the Commission offered a new reason to justify the Commission’s inaction when 
asked whether it may have been easier to deal with the situation in Poland had the EU 
not turned ‘a blind eye to Victor Orbán’s actions’ for so long:  
 
Poland and Hungary are different. Orbán and the Hungarian government have never refused a 
dialogue with us. A constructive dialogue, not only pointing at divergent views, is the 
European way of solving such disputes. But the truth is that a few times we have opened 
procedures against Hungarian handling of the law. And this has stopped, for instance, 
decrease of the pension age for the judges [by this means Orbán tried to eliminate established 
judges and introduce his own].88 																																																																																																																																																														
Policy Insights, No 2017/14, April 2017. For a critique of the Lex NGO, see Venice Commission, 
Hungary – Opinion on the Draft Law on the Transparency of Organisations receiving support from 
abroad, CDL-AD(2017)015-e, Strasbourg, 20 June 2017: the Law adopted on 13 June 2017 ‘will cause 
a disproportionate and unnecessary interference with the freedoms of association and expression, the 
right to privacy, and the prohibition of discrimination’ (para 68).  
85  See e.g. CEU, ‘Portuguese Parliament Unanimously Condemns Lex CEU’, 24 April 2017: 
https://www.ceu.edu/article/2017-04-24/portuguese-parliament-unanimously-condemns-lex-ceu; 
Council of Europe (PACE), Alarming developments in Hungary: draft NGO law restricting civil 
society and possible closure of the European Central University, Resolution 2162, 27 April 2017; US 
Department of State, Government of Hungary’s Legislation Impacting Central European University, 
Press Statement, 23 May 2017 (‘The United States again urges the Government of Hungary to suspend 
implementation of its amended higher education law, which places discriminatory, onerous 
requirements on U.S.-accredited institutions in Hungary and threatens academic freedom and 
independence’).   
86 M de la Baume, ‘MEPs increasingly back kicking Viktor Orbán out of EPP’, Politico, 27 April 2017: 
http://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-europe-meps-increasingly-back-kicking-out-of-epp.   
87 European Parliament resolution of 17 May 2017 on the situation in Hungary (2017/2656(RSP)).  
88 B Wieliński, Interview with Timmermans: ‘Poland should be a leader in Europe – but it needs to 
cooperate’, Euractiv, 22 May 2017. We might add that Timmermans’ optimism about the effects of the 
earlier infringement action can be met with evidence that shows that the vast majority of Hungarian 
judges were in fact removed from office and Fidesz-loyal judges substituted in their place. Once the 
infringement action was brought on age discrimination grounds, compensation of those adversely 
affected rather than their reinstatement became an adequate remedy. See K L Scheppele, ‘Enforcing the 
Basic Principles of EU Law through Systemic Infringement Procedures’ in C Closa and D Kochenov 
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There are several rather obvious problems with this ‘defence’. First, it is hard to 
reconcile it with Jourová’s previous emphasis on the existence of national rule of law 
safeguards which, allegedly, would still be functioning and effective in Hungary 
contrary to the situation in Poland. Second, it suggests that would-be-autocrats are 
free to undermine the rule of law as long as they agree to enter into a dialogue with 
the Commission. Third, what the Commission may view as constructive dialogue with 
Orbán may be viewed by those with experience with the current Hungarian 
government as a façade of dialogue only. As shown by the multiple and recurrent 
violations of EU values listed by the European Parliament in its multiple resolutions 
on the ‘situation’ in Hungary, this dialogue has led only to minor tinkering with 
offending laws and to no substantial changes in the overall situation since the debate 
about Hungary’s descent into authoritarianism began.  
The Hungarian’s answer to the latest infringement action initiated by the 
Commission with respect to the so-called Lex CEU also makes Timmermans’ 
‘constructive dialogue’ thesis ring particularly hollow. Speaking of the letter of 
formal notice publicly announced by Timmermans on 26 April 2017, János Lázár, 
Orbán’s chief of staff, said that the ‘Commission was unable to present a single, 
normal legal argument which could be taken seriously,’89 using the same defiant 
language which deployed by Polish officials in their dealings with the EU. Given that 
CEU has a deadline for compliance of October 2017 and there is no chance of getting 
a ruling from the Court of Justice by that time, the Hungarian government knows that 
it has already won the battle for CEU by appearing to engage in ‘dialogue’.90   
Finally, considering the Commission’s track record in bringing infringement 
proceedings, it is puzzling that Frans Timmermans still appears to believe that the 
Commission’s actions could lead to a successful outcome. To paraphrase him, ‘the 
truth’ is the opposite of what he suggested as explained by Agnes Batory, a professor 
at the Central European University:  
 
[…] compliance was creative (the judges were allowed to return to the courts, but not to the 
high administrative positions they had been removed from, since those had been filled during 
their forced early retirement; the ombudsman was given compensation but his position was 
not reinstated) or symbolic (with the government backing off only to appoint a Fidesz loyalist 
as Central Bank governor down the line). None of the concessions prevented the Hungarian 
government from achieving its partisan goals. Commission action amounted to little more 
than chipping away at the edges of a new constitutional order cementing a single political 																																																																																																																																																														
(eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 
105. 
89 See Associated Press, ‘Hungary Sees No Reason to Change Law Affecting Soros School’, US News, 
25 May 2017: https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/new-york/articles/2017-05-25/hungary-sees-
no-reason-to-change-law-affecting-soros-school 
90 In a preliminary opinion issued on 11 August 2017, the Venice Commission regretted the lack of a 
‘more transparent and inclusive legislative procedure’ with respect to the adoption of the Lex CEU and 
noted that ‘introducing more stringent rules without very strong reasons, coupled with strict deadlines 
and severe legal consequences, to foreign universities which are already established in Hungary and 
have been lawfully operating there for many years, appears highly problematic from the standpoint of 
rule of law and fundamental rights principles and guarantees’: Opinion 891/2017, Hungary – 
Preliminary Opinion on Act XXV of 4 April 2017, CDL-PI(2017)005, paras 120 and 123. This Opinion 
was met with what has now become the inane default answer of any member or official associated with 
Hungary’s ruling party when faced with external criticism. See e.g. ‘Governing Fidesz says some in 
Venice Commission sponsored by Soros’, Daily News, 13 August 2017: 
https://dailynewshungary.com/governing-fidesz-says-venice-commission-sponsored-soros/ (citing the 
parliamentary group leader of the Fidesz party). 
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party’s hold on political power in an EU member state.91 
 
Even Věra Jourová no longer shares Frans Timmermans’ confidence in the 
effectiveness of infringement actions. Having noted ‘worrying trends’ in both Poland 
and Hungary, she argued that the imposition of any administrative steps, 
infringements or any other measures was unlikely to result in ‘any real change.’92  
There is arguably only one key difference which may explain, but not justify, 
why the Commission decided that it had no choice but to activate the Rule of Law 
Framework against Poland: In the absence of a supermajority to revise the Polish 
Constitution, the ruling party had to blatantly violate the Constitution in order to 
achieve its authoritarian goals while in Hungary, the government’s constitutional 
majority in the parliament allowed it to create an illiberal state by amending the 
constitution every time it was tempted to violate it. Indeed, in the Polish situation, the 
Commission was primarily seeking to get a Member State to comply with its own 
Constitution and stop undermining the independence and functioning of its 
Constitutional Tribunal, hence avoiding the potential neo-colonial criticism that might 
come from the EU requiring a Member State to follow EU law. In Hungary, 
Commission seemed much less confident challenging laws that had been enacted in a 
domestically constitutional manner. With Hungary, the Commission’s default 
preference was to use the infringement procedure, which, given the way it has been 
deployed, has not produced any meaningful results because it aimed to reverse facts 
on the ground, something it did not have the power to accomplish. The reasons behind 
the failure of the EU institutions, and in particular, the Commission, to counter 
‘constitutional capture’ and prevent rule of law backsliding will be further analysed 
below.  
 
IV.  THE LIMITS OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS  
IN PROTECTING EUROPEAN VALUES 
 
The Treaties imagine that all European institutions play a role in protecting European 
values. The Commission may propose to trigger Article 7 TEU, but so may Member 
States, and the Parliament. While enacting any part of Article 7 TEU requires 
supermajorities of both Parliament and Council, it is unclear who should go first in 
framing the action and in determining its timing. Perhaps it is precisely this attempt to 
spread responsibility for European values across EU institutions that has resulted in 
the paralysis we have witnessed even while Member States attack the basic values of 
the European project. To sanction any Member State, the vast majority of – and in the 
case of sanctions, all – Member States must act together, just as the vast majority of 
MEPs must also agree, but no institution bears the primary responsibility for starting 
the process or ensuring that the record is compiled to sustain the charges. 
While the European Commission should be commended for at least attempting 
to take the initiative in preventing rule of law backsliding via the adoption and 
application of a new instrument (Part IV.A), the Council has been, at best, missing in 
action. Not only has it repeatedly failed to rise to the challenge, but it has, at times, 
played an overtly counterproductive role (Part IV.B). And while the European 
Parliament has regularly adopted resolutions calling for action, it has itself proved so 																																																								
91 A Batory, ‘Defying the Commission: Creative Compliance and Respect for the Rule of Law in the 
EU’ (2016) 94(3) Public Administration 685. 
92 N Nielsen, ‘EU commissioner tells Hungarians to resist Orban’ EUobserver, 10 April 2017: 
https://euobserver.com/justice/137559.  
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far unable to offer more than a critique of other EU institutions’ inaction, a situation 
which one may connect to the prioritisation of party politics by some of its members. 
So far the Parliament has never mustered the relevant supermajority to trigger Article 
7 TEU on its own (Part IV.C). This section takes each of the major institutions one by 
one to show how the different pressures on each have made that institution ineffective 
in protecting European values.   
 
A. The European Commission’s Failings 
 
Our main critique of the European Commission in failing to uphold the rule of law 
across the Union is this: Both the design of the Rule of Law Framework and its 
subsequent application to Poland reveal the Commission’s failure to draw the right 
lessons from its past dealings with Hungary, where the Commission failed to halt the 
consolidation of power before it became entrenched. It was clear from the start that 
the Rule of Law Framework suffered from a crucial design weakness; it was entirely 
based on the highly questionable presumption that a discursive approach – a 
‘constructive dialogue’ 93  or a ‘broader political dialogue’94  to paraphrase Frans 
Timmermans – could lead to positive outcomes. But when a government is bent on 
deliberately undermining constitutional checks on power, dialogue only gives that 
government time to consolidate gains. While the Commission may be forgiven for 
failing to understand Orbán’s strategy when he first set out to create an ‘illiberal 
state’, it is difficult to understand how the Commission could still consider in 2015 
that a period of ‘structural dialogue’ could restrain anyone else who was using Orbán 
as a model. If Member States stumbled into violating European values unawares, it 
might have been helpful to warn them. But if Member States are deliberately 
undertaking to become illiberal, then dialogue – itself premised on liberal values – is 
unlikely to work. Looking back, it should have been obvious that the non-legally 
binding nature of the rule of law recommendation(s), and the discretionary recourse to 
Article 7 TEU upon continued noncompliance were bound to produce fruitless 
discussions that failed to slow down the consolidation of power, as indeed the Polish 
case has since demonstrated.  
The Polish saga has revealed another shortcoming: By further postponing the 
eventual triggering of Article 7(1) TEU, the activation of the Rule of Law Framework 
has given the Polish authorities time to further entrench legal changes that are clearly 
incompatible with Article 2 TEU while allowing the other EU institutions to believe 
that the Commission has the problem in hand. While the Commission may not have 
drawn the right lessons from its past dealings with Hungary, the current Polish 
authorities have been eager students of the Hungarian case. They have not failed to 
notice that the EU acts slowly and that there is not much the Commission can do if it 
is presented with a fait accompli. Once a government has created facts on the ground - 
packed courts, fired officials, purged institutions - the Commission’s tools fail to 
work.  The Commission can virtually never force a change in an existing situation but 
																																																								
93 B Wieliński, Interview with Timmermans, note 88 above.  
94 European Commission, Opening remarks of First Vice-President Frans Timmermans in the European 
Parliament debate on Hungary, Speech/17/1118, Brussels, 26 April 2017: ‘We also considered that 
given the wider situation […] a broader political dialogue between the Hungarian authorities, other 
Member States, and the European Parliament and the Commission should take place.’ This speech 
includes no less than ten references to the need for or the benefits of a ‘dialogue’.  
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only lay out ground rules for the future.95  Poland’s ruling party must have understood 
that it would not be possible for the Commission in Poland, as it was not possible for 
the Commission in Hungary, to reinstate fired judges (or dismiss unlawfully 
appointed ones), insist on new members of no-longer-independent boards, restore 
civil society organisations closed by funding cuts or amplify the robustness of the 
opposition after state-sponsored bullying had scared people into leaving the country. 
During the rule of law ‘structured dialogue,’ Poland has seemed to speed up its 
program of undermining checks on power even as EU institutions appeared to have de 
facto delegated monitoring and follow up to the Commission, acting alone. During 
this time, other EU institutions were willing to wash their hands of this mess while the 
Commission appeared to be in charge so they aided and abetted the consolidation of 
power in Poland through inaction. 
The Polish rule of law probe also exposed the Commission’s failure to foresee 
that the presence of two illiberal countries in the EU would annihilate the dissuasive 
nature of the sanctioning arm of Article 7(2-3) TEU, which requires a unanimous vote 
in the European Council before sanctions can issue. Poland and Hungary clearly saw 
this possibility, however, because Orbán quickly announced Hungary would veto 
Article 7 sanctions 96  as soon as the Commission launched the Rule of Law 
Framework against Poland.97  
The Polish case has further confirmed that the Commission’s discretionary 
power to activate the Framework could easily lead to like cases being treated as 
unlike for reasons of political convenience. Hungary, the case for which the 
Framework was designed, has still never been challenged under the Framework even 
though it carried out many of the same policies that caused the Framework to be 
activated in the Polish case. Some commentators have speculated that the 
Commission failed to act against Hungary because the powerful European People’s 
Party (EPP) protected an allied government while the Commission acted quickly 
against Poland, whose government was affiliated with the more marginal European 
Conservatives and Reformists (ERC) party.98 It is otherwise difficult to convincingly 
explain why two similar cases should be treated so differently.99 
																																																								
95 One irony of the Commission’s infringement actions against Hungary is that the Commission was 
able to ensure that Hungarian judges were protected in the future from unexpected changes in their 
collective terms of employment but the benefits went to the judges that Orbán’s team had handpicked 
for office. In short, the infringement action resulted not in Orbán’s judges being removed and the 
previously independent judges reinstated, but instead in Orbán’s judges becoming more entrenched in 
office. See K L Scheppele, ‘Making Infringement Procedures More Effective: A Comment on 
Commission v. Hungary, Case C-288/12’, Eutopia Law, 29 April 2014: 
http://eutopialaw.com/2014/04/29/making-infringement-procedures-more-effective-a-comment-on-
commission-v-hungary-case-c-28812-8-april-2014-grand-chamber  
96 See e.g. C Keszthelyi, ‘Hungary counts on Poland veto, won’t backtrack’, Budapest Business 
Journal, 23 May 2017: https://bbj.hu/politics/hungary-counts-on-poland-veto-wont-backtrack_133253  
97 H Foy et al, ‘Orban promises to veto any EU sanctions against Poland,’ Financial Times, 8 January 
2016.   
98 M Matthijs and D Kelemen, ‘Europe Reborn: How to Save the EU from Irrelevance’ (2015) 94 
Foreign Affairs 96; Interview with R Tavares and K L Scheppele, ‘The Rule of Law Challenge in 
Europe: From Hungary to Poland’ European Green Journal, 23 January 2016: 
https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/the-rule-of-law-challenge-in-europe-from-hungary-to-poland/   
99 For an overview of the additional factors which may explain why the Commission ‘seems to be 
treating the Polish government more harshly than the Hungarian one’, see also A Gostyńska-
Jakubowska, ‘Poland: Europe’s new enfant terrible?’ CER Bulletin article, 22 January 2016: 
http://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2016/poland-europes-new-enfant-terrible   
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Had Hungary been subject to the Rule of Law Framework as requested by the 
European Parliament in December 2015,100  we could now be in a position to 
simultaneously subject both Poland and Hungary to sanctions under Article 7 TEU. In 
doing so, one could argue that no country currently under Article 7 challenge should 
be able to protect another state similarly under challenge since any interpretation of 
Article 7 in the light of the effet utile principle should logically lead one to conclude 
that Poland and Hungary ought to lose their veto of sanctions against the other in such 
a scenario. Be that as it may, we submit that the Commission has failed in its duty to 
act as the guardian of the Treaties by not triggering Article 7 TEU against both Poland 
and Hungary even apart from the instrumental reason that Article 7 TEU is foiled by 
two rogue states acting in concert if sanctions are attempted against them one at a 
time.   
The Commission has come up to a cliff’s edge with Poland while having 
threatened on numerous occasions to take further steps with Hungary without 
consequence. But the Commission always stops before it can take serious steps. It 
seems to believe that it must secure the Council’s backing before activating 7(1) TEU, 
but this adds a political element which may be considered ill-advised for an institution 
that is supposed to act independently and whose insulation from politics was 
institutionally organised to enable it to take ‘difficult’ decisions in ensuring the 
uniform application of Union law. Pragmatically speaking, if the Commission 
triggered Article 7 TEU, it would finally oblige national governments, meeting in the 
Council, to face up to their own responsibilities to keep European values at the centre 
of the Treaties.  
 
B. The Council: Between Lethargy and Acquiescence 
 
While our criticism has been so far directed at the Commission, the Commission’s 
inability to prevent rule of law backsliding in Hungary and Poland is due in no small 
part to the lack of any strong support originating from the European Council or the 
Council of Ministers. And in the few instances where either Council has decided to 
move out of their usual torpor, their ill-advised interventions weakened the 
Commission’s authority.  
Indeed, rather than unambiguously supporting the Commission’s Rule of Law 
Framework, national governments decided instead to establish their own ‘annual rule 
of law dialogue’,101 which is tragically ineffective because it asks EU countries to 
report on themselves without any independent check. This inevitably tends to produce 
more self-congratulation than criticism, as indeed it has thus far. The Council’s rule of 
law dialogue scheme followed on the adoption of a poorly argued opinion by the 
Council Legal Service in which it denied the Commission’s authority to adopt its Rule 
of Law Framework.102 Both this opinion and the decision not to explicitly support the 																																																								
100  European Parliament, Resolution of 16 December 2015 on the situation in Hungary 
(2015/2935(RSP)). 
101 Council of the EU, 3362nd Council meeting, General Affairs, press release no. 16936/14, 16 
December 2014.  
102 Legal Service, Council of the European Union, Opinion on the Commission’s proposed Framework 
on the Rule of Law of 27 May 2014 (10296/14). As noted by Kochenov and Pech, Article 7 ‘already 
implicitly empowers the Commission to investigate any potential risk of a serious breach of the EU’s 
values by giving it the competence to submit a reasoned proposal to the Council should the 
Commission be of the view that Article 7 TEU ought to be triggered on this basis’ with the 
Commission saying explicitly as much ‘in 2003 in its Communication on Article 7 TEU without the 
Council expressing any objection then’, note 24 above, pp 529-530. For similarly strong critiques of 
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Commission’s Framework were particularly disappointing and one may wonder what 
had happened to the countries, which just a few years before, asked the Commission 
to introduce a ‘new, light mechanism’ to enable it to make recommendations or report 
back to the Council ‘in the case of concrete evidence of violations’ of the EU’s 
fundamental values or principles.103  
During the Barroso Commission, the European Council remained completely 
silent on the situation in Hungary. Even in the Juncker Commission, when it became 
clear that Hungary was not an isolated case, the European Council broke its silence 
about the rule of law crisis only once. Then, European Council President Donald 
Tusk, himself a Pole, made a statement on the eve of a confrontation in Poland 
between governing party MPs and opposition protestors but only to suggest that all 
sides might behave themselves, and honour the Polish constitution.104 The European 
Council, however, did not act as an institution and its component Member States 
largely refrained from comment. This abdication of the European Council as the one 
of the EU’s largest countries abandoned the rule of law reveals yet another weakness 
in the European project: A country that could meet the entry criteria to join the EU 
was presumed to retain its constitutional-democratic commitments over the long haul 
so the EU gave itself few options to correct problems if a country’s commitments 
began to falter.105  
If the EU is not a community of values, however, it is only an economic shell. 
Amnesty International was therefore right to call for European governments to ‘step 
up to the plate and support the people of Poland by placing this serious threat to rule 
of law and human rights on the agenda of the Council’.106 The Council, meeting in the 
General Affairs Council configuration, finally put the rule of law crisis on its agenda 
for the first time in 16 May 2017 and, in that session, a majority of Member States 
criticised Poland for its behaviour and lack of cooperation with the Commission. Only 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom, directly or indirectly 
supported Poland’s position.107 However unprecedented, this was mere criticism, not 
a move toward deadlines, ultimatums or sanctions. And, as we have seen, the Council 
did not act but instead told the Commission to continue its dialogue with Poland. The 
Polish government’s rush to purge of the whole Polish judiciary soon afterwards 
showed the government clearly believed that nothing would happen to it if it did.     																																																																																																																																																														
this opinion, which has since been referred to by the Polish government to argue that the Commission 
is acting ultra vires, see also P Oliver and J Stefanelli, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law in the EU: The 
Council’s Inaction’ (2016) 54(5) Journal of Common Market Studies 1075; L Besselink, ‘The Bite, the 
Bark and the Howl: Article 7 TEU and the Rule of Law Initiatives’ in A Jakab and D Kochenov (eds), 
The Enforcement of EU Law and Values (Oxford University Press, 2017), p 136 et seq. 
103 See Final Report of the Future of Europe Group, 17 September 2012. Ironically, Poland was one of 
the eleven signatories of the so-called Westerwelle Report. 
104 Reuters, ‘Poland crisis: Donald Tusk calls for respect of people and constitution’, The Guardian, 17 
December 2016.  
105 See e.g. Editorial Comments, ‘Fundamental Rights and EU membership: Do as I say, not as I do!’ 
(2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 481. Arguably, the Council of Europe was supposed to prevent 
and remedy any eventual problems arising post EU accession. For a recent book offering a 
comprehensive overview of the pivotal role played by the Council of Europe in the promotion and 
protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, see S Schmahl and M Breuer, The Council 
of Europe. Its Law and Policies (Oxford University Press, 2016).   
106 Amnesty International, EU: Commission’s action to stand up for rights of people in Poland must be 
backed by European States, Press release, 21 December 2016: http://www.amnesty.eu/en/news/press-
releases/all/eu-commission-s-action-to-stand-up-for-rights-of-people-in-poland-must-be-backed-by-
european-st-1013/#.WGC9nWSLRhC 
107 D Robinson, ‘EU ministers hit out at Poland over judicial reforms’, Financial Times, 16 May 2017. 
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Speaking after the Council’s meeting but before the rule of law situation 
further deteriorated in July, Frans Timmermans, said: ‘All the tools are in the toolbox 
and if we need to use a tool in the toolbox, then the commission is free to do so.’108 
Time will tell whether the Council’s minimalistic support will finally convince – or at 
least not dissuade – the Commission to trigger Article 7 TEU against Poland. In the 
meantime, the European Parliament has begun a process to activate Article 7 against 
Hungary.  
We understand that there may be indeed a cost to be paid if the Commission 
calls for the use of Article 7 and none of the other key EU institutions take any note of 
it. But to wait for a clear signal from a majority of national governments that Article 7 
would succeed seems like a pretext for justifying inaction. Indeed, why would any 
national government explicitly signal its intent to support the Commission when there 
is no certainty the Commission would trigger Article 7? Such a public stand would 
require paying a diplomatic price with no guarantee that the Commission would 
follow through. Rather than trying to guess what the other EU institutions would do, 
the Commission should act in its role of guardian of the Treaties and do what the law 
requires rather than what the politics will sustain. 
 
C. The European Parliament and the Prioritisation of Party Politics  
 
Of all the European institutions, the European Parliament has been the most vocal in 
its condemnation of rule of law backsliding in both Hungary and Poland. Early on, the 
Parliament took the lead in putting Article 7 on the table with regard to Hungary, 
when the Tavares Report was overwhelmingly adopted in 2013.109 The Tavares 
Report was not even the first time that the Parliament took a stand: the European 
Parliament had previously passed repeated resolutions criticising particular laws, 
starting with Hungary’s media law and continuing through the constitutional 
overhaul.110 The Tavares Report, however, broke ground in putting the concerns into 
one systemic framework.  Regrettably, the Parliament’s call in the Tavares Report for 
Hungary to be carefully monitored by the Commission, with the goal of eventually 
triggering Article 7 TEU if Hungary did not change its ways, led to no concrete 
actions to address the specific issues listed in the resolution. Indeed, neither the 
Commission nor the Council took up the responsibilities that the Parliament had 
urged on them, and nothing public111 was done about Hungary’s backsliding.112 																																																								
108 Ibid.  
109 The adoption of the so-called Tavares report (see resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of 
fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary) was preceded by the resolutions of 16 
February 2012 on the recent political developments in Hungary and of 10 March 2011 on media law in 
Hungary. 
110 European Parliament, Resolution of 10 March 2011 on media law in Hungary, P7_TA(2011)0094; 
Resolution of 5 July 2011 on the Revised Hungarian Constitution, P7_TA(2011)0315; Resolution of 16 
February 2012 on recent political developments in Hungary, P7_TA(2012)0053.    
111 Various statements coming from the Commission indicated that individual Commissioners may 
have been involved in backstage negotiations with the Hungarian government during this period, but 
external observers still reasonably interpreted the absence of a public commitment to bringing Hungary 
back to the rule of law as a lack of concern for the problem. The Council’s silence, however, masked 
no backstage efforts to address the Hungarian problem, as far as we can tell.   
112 For an overview of the European Parliament’s role and initiatives in this area, see J Sargentini and A 
Dimitrovs, ‘The European Parliament’s Role: Towards New Copenhagen Criteria for Existing Member 
States?’ (2016) 54(5) Journal of Common Market Studies 1085. In July 2017, Judith Sargentini was 
appointed rapporteur for the European Parliament’s investigation into whether Article 7(1) TEU should 
be triggered against Hungary.  
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Rather than seeking to trigger Article 7, which it could do on its own, the European 
Parliament got into the habit of regularly admonishing Hungarian authorities and 
calling for other European institutions to get their acts together to address Hungary.113 
Finally, in May 2017, the Parliament adopted a (non-legislative) resolution on 
Hungary in which it delegated to the Civil Liberties Committee (LIBE) the task of 
writing a resolution that would explicitly trigger the preventive arm of Article 7 
TEU.114  
That said, a key factor explaining the European Parliament’s adoption of the 
resolution of 17 May 2017 was the weakening support for Orbán within the 
European’s People Party (EPP), currently the largest party in the European 
Parliament. Although at least half of the EPP members split from the party’s official 
position and allowed the Tavares Report to pass in July 2013, Orbán has been so far 
effectively shielded from criticism and meaningful sanctions by the leadership of the 
EPP.115 It took blatant attacks on the Central European University in spring 2017 for 
the EPP leadership to finally give its members a free vote when the latest resolution 
regarding Hungary was put to a ballot.116 This small concession has so far enabled 
EPP leaders to avoid an open rebellion and contain discontent without having to 
exclude the MEPs belonging to Orbán’s party. The primary and official reason given 
by the Chair of the EPP group at the European Parliament, Manfred Weber, to justify 
this stance is that Orbán’s engagement with the EPP and the EU at large, by contrast 
to the uncompromising attitude of Kaczyński, was a reason to support Orbán.117 
Considering Orbán’s rhetoric and actions since 2010, one cannot take this reasoning 
seriously.118 Weber’s stance can only be explained by a less noble reason: losing 
Fidesz MEPs, who have been loyal members of the EPP when it comes to voting, 
would undermine the EPP’s primacy within the Parliament and its ability to appoint 
its members to the most powerful offices.119 																																																								
113 See resolutions of 16 December and 10 June 2015 on the situation in Hungary.  
114 Resolution of 17 May 2017 on the situation in Hungary (2017/2656(RSP)). 
115 For an academic analysis that shows how party loyalties can blunt moves to sanction autocratic regimes 
within the EU, see D Kelemen, ‘Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in 
Europe’s Democratic Union’ (2017) 52(2) Government and Opposition 211, p 225: ‘the majority of 
EPP members and the party leadership have repeatedly undermined the efforts of EU institutions to 
censure the Orbán regime.’ On party politics as one of the key obstacles to the triggering of Article 7, 
see also U Sedelmeier, ‘Protecting democracy inside the European Union? The party politics of 
sanctioning democratic backsliding in the European Parliament’ (July 2016) MAXCAP Working Paper 
No 27.  
116 The resolution was adopted by 393 votes against 221, with 64 abstentions. The resolution was 
opposed by the 11 Fidesz MEPs as well as most EPP MEPs from Germany (including Manfred Weber, 
the Chair of the EPP group), Spain, Italy, Romania and other countries, for a total of 93 EPP votes 
against the resolution. Overall, however, a majority of EPP members either voted in favour of the 
resolution (67) or abstained (40).  
117  Reuters, ‘Hungary’s Orban has to change behaviour: EU center-right’, 29 April 2017: 
http://www.srnnews.com/hungarys-orban-has-to-change-behavior-eu-center-right-2.       
118 Most recently, the Hungarian Prime Minister went as far as accusing the EU of siding with 
‘terrorists’: see Z Simon, ‘Hungary’s Orban Rails Against EU But Says He Doesn’t Back Exit’, 
Bloomberg, 12 June 2017: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-12/hungary-s-orban-
rails-against-eu-but-says-he-doesn-t-back-exit  
119 According to an unnamed EPP official, losing Fidesz MEPs ‘would be a “wound” to the group’ 
considering their loyalty and voting record, cited in M de la Baume and R Heath, ‘Center-right’s angry 
at Orbán, but won’t kick him out’, Politico, 6 April 2017. See also T King, ‘Ties that bind Hungary’s 
Fidesz and European Parliament’, Politico, 7 April 2017: ‘By crudely tying the appointment of the 
Commission president to the European Parliament elections, the European Council has given Europe’s 
bigger political groups a perverse incentive to sign up national parties of dubious ideology and/or 
practice to their ranks, and to keep them signed up, no matter their behavior.’ 
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The EPP has had less difficulty calling for decisive action against Poland 
which one may link to the fact that Poland’s governing ‘Law and Justice party’ 
belongs to the ERC, a relatively marginal parliamentary group in the European 
Parliament that is about to become even more marginal when Brexit takes the British 
Tories out of the party. And indeed, to give a single example, the resolution of 14 
September 2016 on developments in Poland, which reiterated the Parliament’s 
concerns about the paralysis of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, was easily adopted 
by 510 votes out of the 699 votes cast. The EPP itself voted overwhelmingly in favour 
of the resolution with only its Hungarian members voting against it, along with a few 
MEPs from elsewhere.  
These precedents suggest that support within the European Parliament for 
preventing or sanctioning rule of law backsliding in a particular country may only be 
secured when the two largest groups in the Parliament – the European People’s Party 
and the Socialists & Democrats group – have no self-interested reason to block the 
Commission’s actions.120 This also means that it would be wrong therefore to lay the 
blame only at the door of the Commission for not having done more with respect to 
Hungary when it has a Council missing in action and the largest party in the 
Parliament doing its best to shield Orbán from EU censure. The politics of the rule of 
law in the EU are far less principled than they should be.   
As we write, it remains uncertain whether the report called for in the 
resolution of 17 May 2017 that will propose activation of Article 7(1) TEU will 
secure the ‘two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing the majority of its 
component Members’, as required by Article 354 TFEU. Based on the results of the 
vote on 17 May 2017 – when the resolution was adopted by 393 votes out of 678, i.e. 
58% of the voting MEPs with abstentions included – defenders of the rule of law do 
not yet have the votes. Assuming the same reluctant attitude and mixed messages 
from EPP leadership, the activation of Article 7(1) will be a close call as it will 
require a two-third majority which should include at least 376 MEPs. Perhaps it 
would be easier to trigger Article 7(1) against Poland which, considering Polish 
authorities’ behaviour and record since January 2016, would also be amply justified.   
In light of the above, one may conclude that there are three primary 
shortcomings of the EU answers to the ‘illiberal’ turn in Hungary and Poland:   
 
(i) EU institutions have a tendency to procrastinate even when faced with 
evident and persistent breaches of EU values by would-be-authoritarians but 
procrastination only makes this particular problem worse;  
(ii) EU institutions’ default position is to hide their inaction behind strong 
rhetoric and to mask their ineffectiveness with symbolic compromises, 
declaring victory when facts on the ground have not changed, and  
(iii) Partisan loyalties have so far been stronger than the rule of law.    
 
It is only because Polish authorities have been so blatantly uncompromising – 
even publicly rude – in their dealings with EU officials, so plainly undeterred in their 
attempts to destroy their own judiciary and so clearly undefended by a major pan-																																																								
120 V van Hüllen and T Börzel, ‘The EU’s Governance Transfer. From External Promotion to Internal 
Protection?’ (2013) SFB-Governance Working Paper No 56, p 22. See also M Meijers and H van der 
Veer, ‘Hungary’s government is increasingly autocratic. What is the European Parliament doing about 
it?’ Washington Post, 3 May 2017 (having examined 1,634 written parliamentary questions from April 
2010 until January 2017, authors argue that the EPP has sought to keep Hungary’s democratic 
backsliding off the agenda and that radical rights parties similarly kept quiet on this issue). 
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European party, that the Commission takes few risks in proceeding. By contrast, 
Hungarian authorities know how to play the EU game by engaging symbolically and 
retreating strategically (if temporarily) when they must. Plus, the governing party in 
Hungary picked its political family well, as recently demonstrated by Jean-Claude 
Juncker’s public support for Orbán, a fellow member of the EPP.121 In engaging in a 
semblance of dialogue and symbolic compliance when they must, the Hungarian 
authorities have done just enough to retain the support of the EPP leadership and to 
permit the Commission to claim that the dialogue continues, while still undermining 
the rule of law at every turn. 
 
V. THE WAY FORWARD: LOOKING BEYOND ARTICLE 7 TEU 
TO PRESERVE THE RULE OF LAW 
 
Save for an effet utile interpretation of Article 7 TEU that would allow a simultaneous 
Article 7 move against both Hungary and Poland to eliminate the veto of each in 
favour of the other, the presence of two illiberal EU countries means that the 
sanctioning arm of Article 7 has been effectively neutralised by the need for 
unanimity in the European Council. Against this background, officials, academics and 
civil society groups have proposed a range of ambitious solutions requiring Treaty 
change, such as rewriting Article 7.122 It is however unrealistic to expect any Treaty 
change in this area if only because EU Treaties also require unanimity and Member 
States still in the crosshairs can be expected to veto such changes. As such, rather than 
discussing ‘pie in the sky’ type solutions, we will offer an overview of the most 
promising proposals for dealing with the rule of law crisis in the current moment. We 
begin with the recent and ambitious proposal adopted by the European Parliament 
(Part V.A), and then consider a number of additional proposals (Part V.B) before 
ending with what is, in our opinion, the most realistic outcome one may expect given 
the present circumstances (Part V.C).  
 
A. The European Parliament’s Proposal for a New Mechanism 
 
																																																								
121 ‘Asked about the difference between dealing with the Polish leadership and Hungary’s Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán, Juncker said: “Well, I’ve got a caring relationship with Orbán. We talk 
regularly, I see him regularly — even if it’s not always made public — because I think I do not want to 
lose Hungary.” He didn’t make the same pledge about Poland, or even mention it’, F Eder, ‘Jean-
Claude Juncker, upbeat and ready for a fight’, Politico, 3 August 2017.  
122 For an overview of the proposals made before the adoption of the Rule of Law Framework in 2014, 
see Kochenov and Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU’, see note 24 
above, p 526. See also the proposals mentioned in the European Parliament resolution of 25 October 
2016 on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights 
(2015/2254(INL)), and which can be summarised as follows:  
- Article 2 TEU and the EU Charter to become a legal basis for legislative measures;  
- National courts to gain jurisdiction bring proceedings relating to the legality of Member States’ 
actions on the same basis;  
- Revision of Article 7 TEU;  
- One-third of MEPs to gain the right to refer EU legislation to the CJEU; 
- Revision of legal standing rules for natural and legal persons under Article 263 TFEU in situations 
where they allege violations of the EU Charter;  
- Abolition of Article 51 of the Charter to transform EU Charter into a proper federal Bill of Rights;  
- Revision of the unanimity requirement when it comes to adopting legislation in areas relating to 
fundamental rights. 
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On 25 October 2016, the European Parliament recommended the establishment, ‘until 
a possible Treaty change’, of a new mechanism in the form of an interinstitutional 
agreement to more effectively monitor EU countries’ adherence to the values laid 
down in Article 2 TEU.123 This mechanism would permit ongoing assessment of all 
Member States’ compliance with the rule of law so as to be able to spot deviating 
states early. The proposed new mechanism’s new features can be summarised as 
follows:  
 
(i) Instead of the current ‘crisis-driven’ approach where EU institutions react to perceived 
breaches of Article 2 values in specific countries, the new mechanism would be a 
permanent one to which all EU Member States would be subject as a matter of principle;  
 
(ii) Called the DRF pact (DRF stands for Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental 
Rights), the new mechanism also aims to guarantee compliance with EU values through 
preventative as well as corrective and sanctioning measures. Potential breaches at national 
level would be identified via new annual reports (DRF Report) that would include a 
general part and country-specific recommendations. This would be accompanied by a 
new monitoring cycle (DRF policy cycle) involving the main EU institutions, national 
parliaments as well as civil society, the EU Fundamental Rights Agency and the Council 
of Europe.  The Commission would take the administrative lead when it comes to 
assessing compliance with Article 2 TEU on the basis of these new reports; 
 
(iii) To avoid political influence when it comes to assessing a country’s adherence to Article 
2, a new expert panel (DRF Expert Panel124) is to be set up and be made responsible for 
drafting the DRF report;  
 
(iv) To avoid confusion and duplication, the DRF report is supposed to incorporate into a 
single instrument the Commission’s Rule of Law Framework and the Council’s Rule of 
Law Dialogue as well as the Commission’s Justice Scoreboard, the Media Pluralism 
Monitor, the anti-corruption report and peer evaluation procedures based on Article 70 
TFEU, which provides for the establishment of Member State monitoring mechanisms. It 
would also replace the existing Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for Bulgaria and 
Romania; 
 
(v) In situations where evidence supports the conclusion that there are breaches of core 
elements of Article 2 values, the Commission is to start a dialogue with that Member 
State without discretion or delay;  
 
(vi) In situation where the DRF expert panel is of the view that there is a clear risk of a 
serious breach of Article 2 values and that there are sufficient grounds for invoking 
Article 7(1) TEU, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission shall each 
promptly discuss the matter and each institution shall adopt a reasoned decision which 
shall be made public; 
 
(vii) Finally, in situations where the DRF expert panel is of the view that there is a serious and 
persistent breach of Article 2 and that there are sufficient grounds for invoking Article 
7(2), the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission shall each discuss the 																																																								
123 European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2016, ibid, para. 1.  
124 The proposal to involve a new expert body is not without recalling the proposal to set up a 
‘Systemic Deficiency Committee’ made by A von Bogdandy et al, ‘Protecting EU values’ in A Jakab 
and D Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values (Oxford University Press, 2017), p 
228 et seq. In this instance, the DRF Expert Panel is to be composed of one qualified constitutional 
court or supreme court judge not currently in active service designated by the national parliament of 
each Member State and ten further experts appointed by the European Parliament chosen from a list of 
experts nominated by: (i) the federation of All European Academies (ALLEA); (ii) the European 
Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI); (iii) the Council of Europe, including the 
Venice Commission, GRECO and the Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner; (iv) the CEPEJ 
and the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE); (v) the UN, the OSCE and the OECD. 
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matter without delay and each institution shall adopt a reasoned decision which shall be 
made public. 
 
The above proposal, which closely reflects the one made by Dutch ALDE MEP 
Sophie in 't Veld, 125  should be commended for offering a comprehensive and 
potentially more effective, transparent and objective framework than currently exists. 
It also positively reflects most of the recommendations made in two research 
reports126  commissioned by the European Parliamentary Research Service. 127  In 
particular, the proposed DRF pact creatively links the suggested DRF report with the 
possible launch of ‘systemic infringement actions’, which would bundle several 
infringements together to make the case that systemic violation is at issue,128 and calls 
for ‘the setting up of an endowment for democracy grant-giving organisation that 
supports local actors promoting’ 129  Article 2 values within the Union. 
Disappointingly, the Commission has since expressed its opposition to the 
Parliament’s proposal on the basis of reasons one may find as unpersuasive as the 
reasons put forward by the Commission to justify not triggering the Rule of Law 
Framework for Hungary:  
 
At this stage the Commission has serious doubts about the need and the feasibility of an 
annual Report and a policy cycle on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights 
prepared by a committee of "experts" and about the need for, feasibility and added value of an 
inter-institutional agreement on this matter. Some elements of the proposed approach, for 
instance, the central role attributed to an independent expert panel in the proposed pact, also 
raise serious questions of legality, institutional legitimacy and accountability. Moreover, there 
are also practical and political concerns which may render it difficult to find common ground 
on this between all the institutions concerned. The Commission considers that, first, the best 
possible use should be made of existing instruments, while avoiding duplication. A range of 
existing tools and actors already provide a set of complementary and effective means to 
promote and uphold common values. The Commission will continue to value and build upon 
these means.130 
 																																																								
125 Report with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on 
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights (2015/2254(INL)), LIBE Committee, Rapporteur: 
Sophie in 't Veld, A8-0283/2016, 10 October 2016. 
126 See European Parliament (EPRS study), An EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and 
fundamental rights – Annex I An EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights 
(study written by L Pech et al.), PE 579.328, April 2016; Annex II Assessing the need and possibilities 
for the establishment of an EU Scoreboard on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights (study 
written by P Bárd et al.), PE 579.328, April 2016. Professor Dimitry Kochenov, a frequent co-author of 
ours, was also involved in drafting Annex II.    
127 According to the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) itself, the root causes of the gap 
between the proclamation of Article 2 values and actual compliance by EU institutions and Member 
States are to be found in certain weaknesses in the existing EU legal and policy framework: See 
European Parliament (EPRS), An EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights, European Added Value Assessment, PE 579.328, October 2016.     
128 European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2016, note 122 above, para. 10. The idea of systemic 
infringement action was first made by one of the present authors: See K L Scheppele, ‘Enforcing the 
Basic Principles of EU Law through Systemic Infringement Actions’ in Reinforcing Rule of Law 
Oversight in the European Union, note 18 above, 105. The use of systemic infringement actions was 
one of the six main recommendations made in European Parliament (EPRS study), An EU mechanism 
on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights – Annex I, note 126 above, p 135.  
129 European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2016, note 122 above, para 17. This also reflects 
another recommendation made in Annex I, note 125 above, p 152. 
130 European Commission, Follow up to the European Parliament resolution on with recommendations 
to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and 
fundamental rights, SP(2017)16, 17 February 2017. 
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This reaction to the constructive proposal of the European Parliament may be viewed 
as the latest example of the Commission simultaneously guarding its territory while 
shirking its responsibilities.131 There is still however one relatively easy way for the 
Commission to do more: It could more forcefully interpret and more vigorously apply 
its infringement powers by initiating ‘systemic infringement’ actions that would 
eventually subject the rule of law rogue states to financial sanctions should they fail to 
change course.  
 
B. The (Short-Term) Way Forward: Systemic Infringement Actions 
 
Given the resistance of the Commission to political persuasion either outside or 
within the rule of law framework, the most promising solution in the short term may 
be for the Commission to respond legally by replying to systemic attacks on the rule 
of law through systemic infringement actions. Such actions would allow the 
Commission to rely on a familiar tool, while adjusting it slightly to meet the new 
challenges. 
The European Commission is the Guardian of the Treaties, and so it is the 
Commission’s responsibility to ensure that the Treaties - including the values that 
form the basis of the Treaties - are in force across the Union.  The infringement action 
is one of its standard tools for ensuring the consistent application of EU law. Even 
without the support of other EU institutions, the European Commission could adopt a 
more ambitious interpretation of its infringement powers by adjusting the normal 
infringement action in two ways to deal with Member States that systematically 
challenge the rule of law: (i) By packaging together a set of distinct complaints into a 
single infringement action, the Commission could show that it can connect the dots 
the same way that the autocrats do by acknowledging that the takeover of multiple 
independent institutions is part of a common plan to erode checks and balances; (ii) 
By defending the view that systemic infringements call for a systemic remedy, the 
Commission could, if confirmed by the Court of Justice, insist on changes that would 
reverse the damage caused to the uniform application of European law across the 
Union.  
The Commission could bring such a ‘packaged claim’ under Article 4(3) TEU 
by arguing that the Member State is systematically thwarting the realisation of EU 
law within its national legal system. Alternatively, it could bundle ordinary acquis 
violations together with violations of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to 
demonstrate that the combined set of violations rises to a more serious level than the 
typical infringement. In fact, the Commission has already done this once with regard 
to its initial objections to Hungary’s asylum policy,132 an approach it broadened when 
it issued its more comprehensive complementary formal notice against Hungary in 
asylum matters in May 2017.133 Alternatively, the Commission could challenge a 
Member State for a violation of Article 2 values directly, under the rubric of the rule 
of law. After all, if it could trigger Article 7 to address rule of law violations, why 																																																								
131 P Bárd and S Carrera, The Commission’s Decision on ‘Less EU’ in Safeguarding the Rule of Law: A 
play in four acts, CEPS no 2017/08, March 2017. 
132 European Commission, Commission opens infringement procedure against Hungary concerning its 
asylum law, Press release, IP/15/6228, 10 December 2015.  
133 The new complementary notice includes new allegations in the area of asylum and immigration 
policy that involve several provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. See European 
Commission, ‘Asylum: Commission follows up on infringement procedure against Hungary 
concerning its asylum law’, May infringements package – Part 1: key decisions, Memo/17/1280, 17 
May 2017.  
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couldn’t it use its ordinary powers to attempt a legal resolution of the matter before 
moving to the more political options laid down in Article 7? 
If the Court of Justice agreed with the Commission that the whole was greater 
than the sum of the parts by finding a systemic violation of EU law, this would give 
the Commission more room to insist on systemic compliance with the principles of 
EU law rather than formalistic compliance with only the formal letter of the acquis. 
The intervention of the Court would also help depoliticise the whole issue, which is 
one of the main objections of governments that argue against any meaningful 
monitoring of their rule of law records by the Commission. Be that as it may, the 
systemic approach advocated here would crucially prevent cosmetic patches from 
disguising the underlying systemic problems. For example, when the Hungarian 
government replaced the existing data protection officer in violation of his EU-law-
guaranteed independence, the rule of law required more than simply compensating the 
person who had been fired. Instead, some guarantee that the data protection function 
would still be independently performed as EU law requires would be important to 
ensure, but that was not done.134 As we saw with the Commission’s piecemeal 
attempts to address the Hungarian government’s initial consolidation of power, the 
Hungarian government could easily meet very specific infringement actions with 
narrow if not largely useless gestures of compliance (for example, compensating the 
old data protection officer while the government’s new data protection officer 
dropped all of the cases brought by the former data protection officer that were 
contested by the government). Had the action been brought on the more ambitious 
argument that the right to data protection was under threat, then the remedies would 
address restoration of the infringed rights. A more comprehensive approach to 
compliance would allow the Commission to tailor the remedies to the nature of the 
problem identified.  
If the Commission is unwilling to reinterpret the infringement procedure in 
this way, then Member States, as suggested by Professor Kochenov, 135  could 
rediscover Article 259 TFEU and test this more comprehensive approach in the Court 
of Justice themselves. Under Article 259 TFEU, one or more Member States can file 
an infringement action directly against another Member State for violating EU law 
and bring the matter before the Court of Justice without requiring the agreement of 
any EU institution. Rediscovering Article 259 could also be a way to push the 
Commission into acting, as an Article 259 TFEU action must go first to the 
Commission to see whether the Commission wants to join the action (thereby 
converting to an Article 258 TFEU infringement action), before the matter is 
eventually brought before the Court of Justice. Article 259 TFEU has the reputation 
of being used for losing causes but that is only because the Commission tends to 
avoid joining the frivolous ones even though those cases can still continue without the 
Commission on board. If a Member State invokes Article 259 TFEU to denounce a 
systemic threat to or breach of the rule of law in another Member State, it might not 
only spur the Commission to act under Article 258 TFEU when it is otherwise on the 
fence, but it also provides an avenue for the relevant Member State(s) to raise 
additional points before the Court of Justice.  																																																								
134 Scheppele, ‘Making Infringement Procedures More Effective: A Comment on Commission v. 
Hungary, Case C-288/12’; see also M Dawson and E Muir, ‘Hungary and the Indirect Protection of EU 
Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 1960.   
135 D Kochenov, ‘Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to 
Make it a Viable Rule of Law Enforcement Tool’ (2016) 15(7) Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 153.  
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Either way - whether the Commission brings an infringement action under 
Article 258 TFEU or one or more Member State(s) bring an action under Article 259 
TFEU - the Court of Justice would then be offered an opportunity to decide whether 
systemic attacks on the rule of law and in particular on the independence of the 
national judiciaries or other institutions crucial for the correct application of EU law 
in Poland and Hungary should lead it to reconsider the principle of mutual trust.136 In 
both Hungary and Poland, national courts have been (Hungary) or are in the process 
of being (Poland) captured by their respective governments so it is no longer possible 
to assume that EU law will be applied properly in cases in which the governments 
have a reason to avoid EU standards more systemically. Since the Commission has 
failed in its front-line responsibility to ensure that Hungary and Poland retained 
independent judiciaries, the Court of Justice will soon be faced with cases that will 
require it to think systemically about what to do when a whole judicial system has 
been politically compromised.137  
To borrow the analogy made by Professor Daniel Halberstam, the EU legal 
order may be viewed as a hydraulic system whose functioning depends on three 
interrelated conditions: a common set of values and similar level of fundamental 
rights protection throughout the Union; the Union’s ability to effectively remedy 
violations of its values at Member State level; and a safety valve for the Court of 
Justice to invoke overriding policy justifications where compliance with mutual trust 
would otherwise tear the Union apart.138 Should one of these elements weaken, the 
remaining element(s) must strengthen correspondingly. As a result, where any EU 
Member State ceases to comply with the most basic understanding of the rule of law 
but the EU institutions have otherwise failed to effectively correct the situation, the 
principle of mutual trust ought to be relaxed at the Court of Justice. Already there is a 
sign that the Court of Justice has endorsed Professor Halberstam’s analysis by 
relaxing the principle of mutual trust when Member States have been found by the 
European Court of Human Rights to breach Convention rights in a systemic way.139  
																																																								
136 The Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU has recently recalled that 
‘co-operation in the field of justice is largely based on mutual trust in the administration of justice 
within the European Union’ and expressed its concern ‘that the interferences by the Polish authorities 
will not only have the effect of undermining the rule of law, but also mutual trust in the administration 
of justice’. See Statement of the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU on 
the Situation in Poland: http://network-presidents.eu/sites/default/files/StatementPoland.pdf  
137 As previously noted and in a welcome move, the Commission has recently and for the first time 
noted a possible direct breach of the independence of Polish courts by reference to Article 19(1) TEU 
in combination with Article 47 of the EU Charter in the context of an infringement action aimed at the 
law on the organisation of ordinary courts: European Commission, ‘European Commission launches 
infringement against Poland over measures affecting the judiciary’, Press release IP/17/2205, 29 July 
2017.  
138 D Halberstam, ‘“It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accesstion 
to the ECHR, and the Way Forward’ (2015) 16(1) German Law Journal 105, p 131. 
139 See NS and ME, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/ME, EU:C:2011:865 (EU law precludes a 
conclusive presumption that Member States observe the fundamental rights conferred on asylum 
seekers) and more recently, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, 
EU:C:2016:198 (where there is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated evidence with respect 
to detention conditions in the issuing Member State that demonstrates that there are deficiencies, which 
may be for instance systemic or generalised, the executing judicial authority must determine, 
specifically and precisely, whether there are substantial grounds to believe that the individual 
concerned by a European arrest warrant will be exposed, because of the conditions for his detention in 
the issuing Member State, to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of 
Article 4 of the Charter, in the event of his surrender to that Member State). 
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But this cautious approach of the Court of Justice, in which it allows specific 
exemptions from the principle of mutual trust only in the face of an adverse decision 
from the European Court of Human Rights has not yet acknowledged that Member 
States may be in violation of basic values protected by the EU treaties beyond those 
also covered by the ECHR or certified by the European Court of Human Rights. 
Without an institution that can assess and monitor compliance with basic EU values, 
as the European Court of Human Rights does for ECHR rights, the Court of Justice 
may feel more reluctant to draw this systemic conclusion on its own. This is another 
reason why the Commission should, at the very least, monitor and document the state 
of the rule of law in problematic Member States.  
Considering that mutual trust is such a bedrock constitutional principle of the 
EU, however, a persistent and systemic threat to this presumption may well signal a 
danger for the Union as such. If so, one may wonder what the Court would decide and 
what it would take as sufficient evidence of a rule of law breach. The Court of Justice 
may have no choice but to confront the issue of whether Polish courts after a 
successful political purge of the judiciary may still be considered independent and 
impartial courts able to provide effective legal protection. While the constitutionality 
of Polish laws can no longer be effectively guaranteed following the unconstitutional 
capture of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, as rightly noted by the Commission, the 
four laws designed to capture the ordinary judiciary pushed through in July 2017 (two 
of which have since been vetoed by the Polish President), ‘raise grave concerns as 
regards the principles of judicial independence and separation of powers’140 and have 
the potential of structurally undermining ‘the independence of the judiciary in 
Poland’.141 This might eventually raise the issue of whether Polish courts would no 
longer constitute ‘courts’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, if the Polish 
ruling party is eventually successful in its attempts to purge and capture the national 
judiciary as a whole. As noted by Professor Sarmiento, in such a situation, Polish 
courts would not have ‘courts of law under the standards of EU law’ and should 
therefore lose their ability to communicate with the Court of Justice via national 
references for a preliminary ruling.142 The same question may be raised in Hungary, 
where judicial appointments and careers are already in the hands of a political official 
after the leadership of the ordinary judiciary had already been purged, as both the 
Venice Commission and International Bar Association have documented.143 While the 
Commission has the luxury of avoiding whatever it does not want to face, the Court 
does not have such a convenient exit strategy when a case raising these issues is 
brought before it.144 																																																								
140 Commission Recommendation of 26 July 2017, note 16 above, para 12.  
141 Ibid, para 45(2).  
142  D Sarmiento, ‘The Polish Dilemma’, Despiteourdifferencesblog, 17 July 2017: 
https://despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com/author/despiteourdifferencesblog/  
143 Venice Commission, Opinion on Act CLXII of 2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of 
Judges and Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation and Administration of Courts of Hungary, Opinion 
663/2012, CDL-AD(2012)001; Venice Commission, Opinion on the Cardinal Acts on the Judiciary 
that were Amended following the Adoption of Opinion CDL-AD(2012)001, Opinion 683/2012, CDL-
AD(2012)020; International Bar Association’s Human Rights Initiative (IBAHRI), Courting 
Controversy:  The Impact of Recent Reforms on the Independence of the Judiciary and the Rule of 
Law in Hungary, September 2012: http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=f95a6bf2-
99cf-42c8-9c24-d3b7a531207c; IBAHRI, Still Under Threat:  The Independence of the Judiciary in 
Hungary, October 2015: http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=a00b5f64-
4b05-4b25-81c6-5e507c45cc74.  
144 In what may be a pure coincidence, in a recent article, the current President of the CJEU strongly 
emphasises that while the principle of mutual trust should be understood as a constitutional one, it is by 
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If a systemic infringement procedure results in an adverse judgment of the 
Court of Justice, and the Commission tries and fails to get the Member State in 
question to comply, the Commission could return to the Court under Article 260 
TFEU to request a large fine, as befits a significant violation, and it could even seek 
penalty payments where relevant.145 In fact, given the capacious wording of Article 
260 TFEU, we see no reason why the Commission could not deduct the resulting fine 
from the funding streams that the EU has allocated to the offending Member State. 
Money is fungible, and withholding EU funds pending a successful removal of the 
infringement would provide an added incentive for the Member State to comply with 
the Court of Justice judgment. In fact, financial sanctions in an infringement 
procedure may be the most effective way to restore the rule of law considering the 
political constraints that seem to paralyse all of the EU institutions outside the 
litigation context. Indeed, Poland and Hungary are two of the largest recipients of EU 
regional and cohesion funding. The prospect of the Commission withholding EU 
funds until a Member State brought itself back into the rule of law fold may well 
concentrate the rogue states’ governments on actual and not just symbolic 
compliance.     
As the recent example of Poland shows, new welfare benefits, seemingly 
unaffordable in the long term, are being used to ‘buy’ popularity while the capture of 
the Polish state is taking place.146 This follows a pattern from Hungary, where state-
owned utility rates were lowered before the last election to persuade voters that the 
governing party should be returned to office.147 Putting a financial squeeze on the 
ability of these governments to buy popularity with electorates may not be a bad 
thing; such governments would have to run for office on their records instead. While 
suspending already committed EU funding would itself breach the rule of law absent 
reasoned opinions within the footprint of existing EU law,148 a number of options may 
be explored in the short term. Attaching the suspension of funds to a judgement under 
Article 260 TFEU is one but this is not the only possibility for withholding EU funds 
for rule of law violations. As suggested by Marek Grela, who was Poland’s first 
permanent representative to the EU, ‘the Commission could declare that the absence 
of independent judicial scrutiny and the sacking of experts means it can no longer 
certify that EU funds are being properly spent’, which ‘could justify additional 																																																																																																																																																														
no means absolute and should not be confused with ‘blind trust’ as mutual trust needs to be ‘earned’ by 
each Member State through effective compliance with EU fundamental rights standards. See K 
Lenaerts, ‘La vie après l’avis: Exploring the principle of mutual (yet not blind) trust’ (2017) 54(3) Common 
Market Law Review 805.  
145 For a critical overview of this suggestion pointing out that financial penalties tend not to improve 
compliance and because they are linked to a Member State’s ability to pay, also tend not to be 
sufficiently significant to result in compliance especially when considering what would be at stake for 
would-be-authoritarians, see D Kochenov, ‘On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance – Reverse Solange 
and Systemic Infringements Analysed’ (2013) XXXIII Polish Yearbook of International Law 145, pp 
167-168. 
146 See e.g. H Foy and E Huber, ‘Polish pension U-turn alarms economics but cheers voters’, Financial 
Times, 3 December 2016. 
147 Orbán gained tremendous popularity by cutting utility rates before the 2014 election but after the 
election, the Commission decided that these rate cuts were not consistent with EU energy policy. E 
Balogh, ‘A New Crusade in Brussels over the Price of Electricity’, Hungarian Spectrum, 3 December 
2016.  
148 For the argument that Regulation No 1303/2013, which governs multiple EU schemes providing 
financial support under the EU cohesion policy, would necessarily imply independent national courts in 
the absence of which the Commission would be entitled to suspend EU funding, see I Butler, ‘To Halt 
Poland’s PiS, Go for the Euros’, Liberties, 2 August 2017: https://www.liberties.eu/en/news/to-halt-
polands-pis-go-for-euros 
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safeguards before structural or agricultural funds are disbursed.’149 EU money could 
also be rerouted through infra-national authorities, sidestepping the central 
government.150 Direct or indirect financial support for civil society groups should also 
be considered. 151  More radically, one suggestion proposes to change the rules 
regarding the next EU budgetary period in order to allow for EU funding to be frozen 
when a country stops complying with the rule of law.152 
 
B. Proposals for the Future: A New Article 2 Conditionality Requirement  
and/or Multi-Speed Europe 
 
New approaches are clearly required.  One proposal that has been suggested involves 
introducing a new conditionality requirement on EU funding that would require 
compliance with European values before funding could be awarded. In the words of 
Commissioner Jourová:  
 
[We] need to ensure that EU funds bring a positive impact and contribute more generally to 
promote the EU’s fundamental rights and values. That is why I intend to explore the 
possibility to strengthen the “fundamental rights and values conditionality” of EU funding to 
complement the existing legal obligations of Member States to ensure the respect of the 
Charter when implementing EU funds.153  
 
This new requirement has been explicitly proposed with the situation in Poland in 
mind as it has been allocated a total of €86 billion from various EU cohesion funds 
for the period 2014-2020 and would, under normal circumstances, expect substantial 
funds in the next budget cycle as well.154 Preparatory work is supposed to begin this 
year, with Commissioner Jourová warning that eligibility criteria for EU structural 
funding as well as the future of the EU cohesion policy are going to be reviewed.155 
Significantly, the suggestion to condition EU cohesion funding on ‘compliance with 
																																																								
149  Taylor, ‘For EU, Poland is not yet lost’, Politico, 23 November 2016: 
http://www.politico.eu/article/for-eu-poland-is-not-lost-yet-jaroslaw-kaczynski-sanctions.  
150 This might be less effective in Hungary where the national government removed the autonomy of 
local governments in the massive constitutional reform of 2011-2012. 
151 See the proposal for a new EU funding instrument modelled on the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights and the European Endowment for Democracy made in report 
commissioned by the European Parliament: EPRS study, Annex I An EU mechanism on democracy, 
the rule of law and fundamental rights (study written by L Pech et al), note 126 above, pp 152-153. 
152 M Meyer-Resende, ‘How to Fix Europe’s Rule of Law Blindspot’, Politico, 12 June 2017: 
http://www.politico.eu/article/how-to-fix-europe-rule-of-law-blindspot-poland-hungary-democratic-
decline/. For an instructive overview of the rise of spending conditionality in EU internal policies in the 
2014-20 budgetary period and the argument that ‘the influx of conditionality in the EU internal 
budgetary process suggests a paradigm shift towards a conditional solidarity, contingent upon Member 
States’ continuous performance under the treaties’, see V Vita, ‘Revisiting the Dominant Discourse on 
Conditionality in the EU: The Case of EU Spending Conditionality’, (2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 1.  
153 ‘10 years of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency: a call to action in defence of fundamental rights, 
democracy and the rule of law’, Vienna, 28 February 2017, Speech/17/403.   
154 See e.g. the data available here: https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/. Poland has for instance been 
allocated ESIF funding of €86 billion representing an average of €2,265 per person over the period 
2014-2020.  
155 M Becker, ‘Democracy in Europe. EU Commissioner Pushes for Hard Line on Poland’, Spiegel 
Online, 7 March 2017:  
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/eu-commissioner-pushes-for-hard-line-on-poland-a-
1137672-druck.html 
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fundamental principles of the rule of law’156 has since received the explicit support of 
Germany and been confirmed by the (German) Commissioner in charge of the budget 
but not the support, rather surprisingly, of the President of the European Commission 
himself.157  
There is no strong appetite to trigger Article 7 against both Hungary and 
Poland, but linking EU funding with Article 2 compliance may be more popular, 
especially given the extra pressure on the EU budget that the UK withdrawal from the 
EU will create.158 A number of counterarguments may however be raised, among 
which one may mention the implicit assumption that rule of law backsliding remains 
primarily a problem for countries that are large recipients of EU funding and that this 
solution therefore appears discriminatory.159  
Should this solution fail to materialise and other measures fail to contain or 
prevent rule of law backsliding, it is then likely that calls for a multi-speed Europe160 
or a two-tiered EU with a more deeply integrated and institutionalised Eurozone161 are 
bound to grow louder. Hungary and Poland are both outside the Eurozone, so calls to 
more strongly integrate the Eurozone and leave the others behind may well allow the 
rule of law states to leave the non-rule-of-law states behind in a second-tier Europe 
without the need to take note explicitly of rule of law problems.   
Faced with the choice between seeing cohesion funds conditioned on values 
compliance or being relegated to a second-tier Europe as the rest of the Member 
States forge ahead, governments in Central Europe may soon, in the words of Ivan 
Krastev, ‘be forced to choose between a future of deeper integration with Western 
Europe, or a future where Central Europe is increasingly marginalized’, that is, 
according to the author, ‘a choice between Emmanuel Macron and Viktor Orbán’.162 
Should other Member States choose multi-speed Europe instead of direct EU 
sanctions, we could then see the institutionalisation of a new European configuration, 
																																																								
156  F Eder, ‘Berlin looks into freezing funds for EU rule-breakers’, Politico, 30 May 2017: 
http://www.politico.eu/article/poland-rule-of-law-europe-germany-berlin-looks-into-freezing-funds-
for-eu-rule-breakers/ 
157 E Maurice, ‘Commission hints at political conditions for EU funds’, EUobserver, 30 May 2017: 
https://euobserver.com/institutional/138063  
158 One should however note that the adoption of the EU’s multiannual financial framework requires 
the unanimous agreement of the Council (Article 312 TFEU). When it comes however to the definition 
of the tasks, priority objectives and the organization of the EU structural funds, the ordinary legislative 
procedure applies (Article 177 TFEU).  
159 M Steinbeis, The Hand on the Faucet, Verfassungblog, 3 June 2017: http://verfassungsblog.de/the-
hand-on-the-faucet/. To this criticism, one might respond that systemic infringement actions followed 
by fines paid for by state treasuries are still available.    
160 See scenario 3 ‘Those Who Want More Do More’ in European Commission, White paper on the 
future of Europe – Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025, COM(2017)2025, 1 March 2017.  
161 European Commission, Reflection paper on the deepening of the economic and monetary union, 
COM(2017)291, 31 May 2017. To reinforce the democratic accountability and effective governance of 
the EMU, the report suggests among other things the institutionalisation of the Eurogroup and the 
setting up of a Euro area Treasury and a European Monetary Fund. One may note in passing that this 
reflection paper also suggests the strengthening of the link between policy reforms and the EU budget 
to foster convergence by making inter alia the disbursement of EU structural and investment funds 
conditional on progress in implementing concrete reforms in areas such as public administration and 
the judicial system via the European Semester.  
162 ‘Central Europe’s Tough Choice: Macron or Orban?’ European Council on Foreign Relations, 23 
June 2017: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_central_europes_tough_choice_macron_or_orban_7303   
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with core EU countries flanked by ‘a buffer zone of semi-autocratic member states on 
its eastern border’.163   
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
During the French presidential election campaign, Emmanuel Macron warned that 
one cannot have a country engaged in social and fiscal dumping ‘while being in 
breach of all its principles’.164  Poland was the clear target of this remark. The newly 
elected French President added that ‘one cannot have an Europe debating the decimal 
point of every single one of the national budgetary issues and which decides to do 
nothing when you have an EU Member State behaving like Poland or Hungary on 
topics relating to university and knowledge, refugees or fundamental values’.165  
Coincidentally or not, Macron’s election was rapidly followed by the first ever 
discussion in the Council of the rule of law situation in a specific Member State 
(about Poland), the first ever parliamentary vote to prepare the ground for triggering 
Article 7 (against Hungary) and increasing pressure on both Poland and Hungary 
from the Council and the Commission with respect to the EU refugee resettlement 
scheme.166 Given what we have seen already, however, one should not expect any 
effective rule of law improvements in Hungary and Poland if the European 
institutions continue to believe in the (illusory merits) of a ‘constructive dialogue’ 
approach with autocrats.  We should also not expect improvements in the situation if 
European parties, particularly the EPP, continue to shield their members from 
European enforcement actions. But perhaps the most discouraging and damning 
reaction of all is the reaction of most of the other Member States so far to the rule of 
law crisis in the EU, a reaction characterized by complete and total silence.      
But the Member States who believe themselves unaffected are not protected 
against the influence of creeping autocracy within the EU. The popular anger and 
party malfunctions that brought Fidesz to power in Hungary and PiS to power in 
Poland are not confined to those two countries. Across the EU, we see signs of 
increasingly popular autocratic leaders coming closer and closer to power. EU 
Member States need to wake up to the fact that the actions of Hungary’s Orbán and 
Poland’s Kaczyński provide a model that can easily spread to other EU countries led 
by populists with autocratic ambitions. Even apart from a desire to preserve the rule 
of law in Poland and Hungary, EU institutions ought to take seriously the threat these 
countries represent to liberal constitutional democracy as such. The more states fall 
victim to the siren song of populism, the harder it will be to solve the problem within 
EU institutions. Better to fix the problems while the EU still can.    
 																																																								
163  B Magyar, ‘The EU’s Mafia State’, Project Syndicate, 21 June 2017: https://www.project-
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165 Ibid.  
166 European Commission, Relocation and resettlement: Commission calls on all Member States to 
deliver and meet obligations, IP/17/1302, 16 May 2017. The Commission’s Twelfth report on 
relocation and resettlement explicitly singles out Poland and Hungary: ‘Hungary and Poland should 
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